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ABSTRACT
A distinction between two types of person reflecting 
two ways in which morality impinges upon life is sought, 
provisionally designated as a distinction between moralist 
and amoralist. The distinction is not easily characterised 
by way of action, emotion, motive, or verbal behaviour, 
and is not related to any egoistic/altruistic distinctions. 
The distinction is finally presented as that between 
believer and non-believer in the existence of intrinsic 
reasons for actions. The problem of applying the dis tinetioi 
is seen as a problem concerning the vagueness of the 
expression 'believer in intrinsic reasons*. Tliree ways in 
which vagueness could enter this expression are isolated.
Of these it is argued that only self-deception does in fact 
provide a source of vagueness, though it will be minimal 
and for the purposes of the remainder of the enquiry may be 
removed by stipulation.
The presence of a belief in the existence of intrinsic 
reasons is manifest in the use of categorical imperatives. 
Thus the distinction may also be presented as that between 
user and non-user of categorical imperatives. An analysis 
of the term 'categorical imperative* is then undertaken and 
a definition based on intrinsic reasons is shown to be 
equivalent to one based on the conditions under which such 
judgements are withdrawn. An investigation of the variety 
of practical judgements that can occur as categorical 
imperatives follows, along with an investigation of the 
variety of reasons for action.
The question of the extent to which there are people 
who use only hypothetical imperatives in. malting their moral 
judgements, and the role of empirical evidence in settling 
this question, is then discussed. A sketch of the difference 
in moral life between user and non-user of categorical 
imperatives is offered. Finally, some ways of justifying 
the use (or non-use) of categorical imperatives are considéré*
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
1#1.Personal Motivation and Aim of Thesis
I have frequently heard talk of the moral life and 
its components - moral decisions, moral approval, moral 
guilt, moral perception, moral sensitivity and even moral 
blackmail. And it has always seemed to me as though I 
did not participate in this moral life, though many of 
my friends and associates have disputed this. In writing 
this thesis I am seeking to make clear the distinction 
that I see between those involved in the moral life and 
the amoreuLists such as myself. If I fail to find this 
distinction, or if it constantly eludes me, I shall be 
forced to concede that there is not the basic difference 
that seemed to be of some importance. If I find that the 
distinction reflects a mere difference in linguistic use - 
that the amoralist*s way of talking can be translated into 
the moralist's by means of a few simple translation rules - 
then I shall have to accept that there was an element of 
delusion that was sustained by this discrepancy in language 
use. If I find that the distinction reflects real non­
verbal behavioural differences, then I shall discuss the 
differences between these two types of person and the 
ways in which their positions can be attacked or supported. 
In the course of this I should discover whether my position, 
which I take to be unorthodox, is tenable; whether there 
is something necessarily vile about amoralists such as 
myself, as a tutor of mine once declared; and hopefully 
change my behaviour so as to bring myself into line if 
I reach any negative conclusions.
2.
What I am seeking, therefore, is a verbal 
characterisation of the moralist or of the amoralist 
that will enable anyone to classify people into one 
of these two types, and that will be suitable for the 
purposes of assessing the two positions. But in using 
the term 'moralist' and 'amoralist' haven't I already 
found my characterisation? The reason why these terms 
are unsatisfactory is that they are too vague.
People have varying ideas as to what an amoral 
person is. Is he someone who is uninterested in the 
welfare of others, or is he someone who actively 
dismpts the welfare of others, or is he someone who 
never does anything for others, or doesn't believe in 
doing things for others, or perhaps just someone with 
unconventional moral views?
I do not claim that the sense in which I shall use 
the terms 'moralist' and 'amoralist' will match that 
most prevalent in the linguistic community.
Before searching for a more precise characterisation 
of the distinction I shall digress briefly to discuss 
vagueness.
1.2. Vagueness
I shall call a proposition vague if and only if 
there need not be universal agreement as to its truth- 
value, because of the way the world is constructed.
I shall call a predicate *P* vague if and only if, 
given complete information, there will be some objects,
X, to which it is intelligible to apply the predicate, 
for which there is not universal agreement as to whether 
or not X is P, and some objects, x> for which *x is P* 
has a determinate truth-value.
I shall distinguish two types of vagueness - 
gradational and multi-dimensional vagueness. Gradational, 
or one-dimensional, vagueness can be removed if necessary 
by harmless stipulation, and there will be associated 
with the predicate a non-vague relation term. Most vague 
predicates will also be relative, so that a specification 
of the class to which the predicate is to apply will be 
necessary if a stipulation is to be made. Thus the term 
'tall* is vague as there will not be universal agreement 
as to where the line is to be drawn between the tall and 
the not tall. Relativised to a class, e.g. the class of 
adult men, the vagueness can be removed by stipulation, 
e.g. tall men are those over 1.80 m, and associated with 
the vague term 'tali' there will be a non-vague relation 
terra 'is taller than'.
Multi-dimensional vague terms, like 'left-wing' and 
'chair' have no corresponding non-vague relation terms, 
and any attempt at stipulation will distort the meaning 
of the terra. For example, an attempt to stipulate 
'left-wing' as 'believing in the nationalisation of all 
industry' would inevitably leave out other factors, upon 
which categorisation of political views depend^
Vagueness is not necessarily an undesirable feature 
of predicates. Terms like 'tali' and 'left-wing' do not 
stand in need of further refinement in most situations in 
which they are used. Vagueness is also a matter of 
degree. The vaguer a predicate 'P' is, the greater will 
be the class of objects x for which there is not complete 
agreement, given adequate information, as to whether x 
is P.
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The distinction that I am searching for, that has 
been provisionally designated as that between the moral 
and the amoral person, must serve in a comparison of the 
two types of behaviour and an assessment of the two 
positions. To these ends it will be advantageous to find 
a characterisation of the distinction with as little 
multi-dimensional vagueness as possible, preferably none.
1.3. Role of Action. Ehiotion and Verbal Behaviour in 
the Moralist/Amoralist Distinction.
Examples will be of no use in conveying the distinction 
unless sufficiently many can be provided to enable people 
to * catch-on* and use the distinction themselves. Examples 
drawn from well-known public or historical figures and 
portraits in literature will play a role in demonstrating 
that there are indeed both moral and amoral characters, and 
in influencing evaluation of these types of character. But 
a characterisation of the distinction will first be necessary 
in order to argue for the chosen classification of the 
figure selected in the example.
How then is this distinction to be presented? I 
expect the moralist to differ from the amoralist in his 
actions and emotion as well as in his verbal behaviour.
But dispositions to a certain sort of action (such as truth- 
telling) or a certain sort of emotion (such as guilt) will 
be difficult to measure, and only indicative of aspects of 
the moral/amoral distinction, i.e. never capable of provid­
ing necessary and sufficient conditions for someone's 
being amoral. Differences of emotion and action I shall 
argue to be often effects of something more fundamental 
underlying the distinetion^rather than as constitutive of it.
I shall concentrate not on the actual differences in 
utterances made in moral situations but consider instead 
whether a person would assent or not assent to propositions 
applying to moral situations. Any difference in assent 
over a particular proposition must be attributed either to
S.
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a difference of beliefs, or to a difference in knowledge 
of the relevant facts. Given situations in which there is 
shared understanding of the concepts used in a proposition, 
and equal knowledge of the relevant facts, a difference 
in assent to the proposition must be explained by a 
difference in beliefs. I shall take the fundamental 
difference between moralist and amoralist to be a systematic 
difference in beliefs, which I will interpret as playing 
a causal role in action, emotion and verbal behaviour.
1.4. Role of Belief in Moralist/Amoralist Distinction.
If it is possible to exhibit all the differences of 
beliefs between moralist and amoralist in terms of one 
central belief, and this is what I meant by a systematic 
difference in beliefs, then it might appear that the 
distinction between moralist and amoralist could turn out 
to be non-vague.
If the central belief is embodied in a proposition, 
then assent to or dissent from this proposition will 
depend either on a difference in the central belief or on 
a different understanding of the concepts involved, since 
background information about particular situations will no 
longer be of relevance. Assuming that the proposition is 
couched in terms that are non-vague and hence understood 
in the same way by all members of the speech community, 
any difference in assent must be attributed to a 
difference in beliefs. Now if those lacking an opinion 
that decline either to assent or dissent are classed as 
non-assenters, then it might be thought that the 
distinction between believers and non-believers would 
correspond to a non-vague distinction between assenters 
and non-assenters. However, as long as there is some 
uncertainty of opinion, there will be a vagueness in 
deciding when the proposition seems sufficiently probable 
to warrant assenting to. Thus a vagueness may enter this 
way into the distinction between moralist and amoralist.
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In distinguishing those that do hold a certain 
belief from those that do not, there will be difficulties 
in ensuring that different people understand the same 
thing by the proposition expressing the belief, and in 
deciding what degree of certainty is necessary to 
count as belief. A further difficulty, especially 
relevant in cases of metaphysical beliefs such as the 
belief in free will or theistic beliefs, concerns self- 
deception. It may be disputed that sincere assent to 
a proposition expressing the relevant belief is necessary 
and sufficient for possession of that belief.
Take, for example, the belief in the existence of 
God. Conceptions of God are likely to vary considerably 
within a speech community^ so a notion of God would need 
to be spelled out in detail before it could be assumed 
that people were considering the same existential 
proposition. Assuming this stage could be reached, and 
assimilating the agnostics to the atheists, a problem 
would still remain as to whether this non-vague distinction 
between assenters and dissenters corresponded to the 
distinction of beliefs at issue. It might be denied that 
someone who sincerely claims to believe in a Christian 
conception of God could genuinely be accredited with such 
a belief if he never participates in standard features of 
Christian life, such as prayer. Alternatively, it might 
be argued that someone displaying certain signs of 
religious behaviour should be accredited with a belief in 
the existence of some sort of God even if such a belief 
is sincerely denied. Once factors in addition to sincere 
assent are included amongst criteria for the possession 
of a belief, there will be great difficulty in determining 
whether someone possesses a belief, and the distinction 
between possession and non-possession of the belief may, 
though not necessarily, be thought vague. Thus in the 
case of the moral/amoral distinction it will be necessary 
first to find a minimally vague proposition that expresses 
the relevant belief, secondly to consider the extent to
7.
which uncertainty (about the belief) introduces a 
vagueness into the distinction between assent and non­
assent to the proposition, and thirdly to discuss 
whether considerations of self-deception should lead 
to the introduction of criteria for the possession of 
a belief in addition to sincere assent.
1. 5.A rv .EgoiStic/Altruistic Distinction Based on Motives
One way I thought it might be possible to 
characterise the moral/amoral diotinction I was search­
ing for was in terras of egoism and altruism. 'Egoist* 
is a dispositional term meaning someone who is prone 
to choosing the egoistic act when an altruistic act 
is also available. The non-egoist will occasionally 
abjure the altruistic act in favour of an egoistic one, 
without it making him into an egoist. An egoistic person 
is thus defined in terms of an egoistic act and this is 
usually taken to mean an act motivated by self-interest.
On this view egoistic acts will be difficult to 
recognise for three reasons. First, because motives 
are themselves difficult to pick out - people are 
frequently mistaken about their motives. Secondly, 
because there may be problems concerning the classifica­
tion of motives as self-interested, or non-self-interested. 
Thirdly, because acts are invariably performed from mixed 
motives, so that an act may often be partly egoistic 
rather than wholly egoistic or altruistic. In addition to 
the variety of ways in which vagueness enters the concept 
of egoistic act, there is a gradational vagueness added 
to this in the concept of egoistic person owing to the 
dispositional nature of the concept.
As well as involving considerable vagueness, the 
distinction between egoistic act and altruistic act differs 
appreciably from what would commonly be regarded as the 
distinction between an amoral act and a moral act, and
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hence also the distinction I am seeldLng* As a duty is 
generally recognised towards the self it is often con­
sidered right to forego some slight altruistic act when 
the cost to the self would be great* So a moral act is 
not necessarily an altruistic act. Nor is an amoral act 
necessarily an egoistic act. Cases of spontaneous 
benevolence such as maternal care for children I would 
want to class as amoral, but in terms of the egoistic/ 
altruistic distinction, an altruistic motive-component 
would have to be separated from such egoistic motive 
components as hope of future reward from the beneficiary 
or other observers, fear of reprimand or lack of future 
assistance from others, eind (contentiously) a feeling of 
self-righteousness. Thus an amoral act may be con­
sidered partly altruistic. It is even possible to imagine act; 
that would be considered immoral and altruistic, as when 
a mother rescues her child from the path of an erupting 
volcano rather than alert a who3a village.
1.6. An Egoistic/Altruistic Distinction Based on 
Survival Chanc es.
It may be instructive at this stage to look at an 
alternative definition of the egoistic/altruistic 
distinction found in biology. An altruistic act is one 
that has a tendency to increase the survival cheinces of 
another organism or organisms whilst lessening those 
of the acting organism. This definition dispenses with 
the notion of motive which is an awkward hybrid between 
a cognitive and a behavioural concept. In so doing, it 
clearly gives a new sense to the terms 'egoistic* and 
•altruistic* and should not be thought of as providing 
an analysis of those terms in their common use. One 
advantage this definition of altruism has, is that it 
is not vague. There is no gradational vagueness about 
the concept of altruistic act as the distinction between 
increasing and decreasing probability is sharp, i.e. there 
is no question of where to draw the line, as there is, for 
example, in the case of tall and not tall people. People
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will not diverge in their classification of acts into 
egoistic and altruistic given adequate evidence. It 
will in principle be possible to verify whether or not 
an act is altruistic by observation of acts of the 
type over a long period of time. In practice, however, 
verification will seldom be feasible, so that there 
would be divergence in classifications of acts into 
egoistic and altruistic owing to lack of sufficient 
evidence.
Principle interest in the biological definition 
could be focussed on altruistic act, but a definition of 
altruistic organism could easily be given, for example 
as one with non-zero disposition to altruistic action.
Humans will vary in their disposition to altruistic acts, 
but with non-human animals this disposition will be more 
or less constant within a species. This biological 
distinction between altruistic and non-altruistic acts 
will not be of much relevance with regard to individual 
human acts because moral and other human action will 
seldom have any appreciable effect on survival chances.
However, arguments from men's ancestry have been 
raised aimed at showing that members of the human 
species are genetically endowed so that given a suitable 
environment they would develop a disposition to altruistic 
behaviour directed beyond their immediate offspring. Such 
arguments, if valid, would suggest that man may sometimes 
automatically act altruistically (still in the biological 
sense), not just because of his training, but from an 
instinct as basic as sexual desire. This may furthermore 
suggest the artificiality of a distinction between egoistic 
and altruistic acts (reverting now to the usual sense of 
the terms), and suggest the extreme implausibility of 
psychological egoism - the view that all human action is 
motivated by self-interest. I say merely 'implausibility* 
rather than 'impossibility' because unconscious, genetically 
based urges need not produce conscious motives, not because 
owing to the need for a suitable environment, genetic 
endowment might never lead to such behavioural dispositions.
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1.7* Kantian Moral/Amoral Distinctions
Having noted the general difficulties in presenting 
the moral/amoral distinction in terms of a distinction 
between motives, and the particular inaptness of a 
distinction between self-interested and non-self- 
interested motives, I shall consider briefly the Kantian 
distinction between moral and amoral motives, Kant writes 
of actions motivated from duty, purposes of self-interest, 
and inclination^though he does not treat these as mutually 
exclusive. Duty and self-interest are distinct, but in 
dividing inclinations into immediate and non-immediate, 
he appears to indicate that non-immediate inclinations 
must be either for purposes of self-interest or duty.
Immediate inclinations include natural benevolence or 
sympathy, but it is not obvious whether Kant would have 
allowed such inclinations to include natural malevolence, 
purposes of self-interest, or duty. The question of 
overlap between the motive of inclination and other motives 
is distinct from the question of the possibility of copresence 
of the three motives. Kant believed that an act could be 
motivated by a mixture of duty, self-interest and 
inclination.
Though this Kantian distinction between the moral 
motive of duty and the amoral motives of inclination and 
self-interest will accord with the moral/amoral distinction  ^
I am seeking, it will fortunately be unnecessary to seek 
any further clarification of it as I can proceed directly 
to an alternative moral/amoral distinction offered by Kant, 
namely his distinction between categorical and hypothetical 
imperatives. This distinction between moral and amoral 
judgements is both wider-ranging and more fundamental than 
that between moral and amoral motives. It is wider-ranging 
because there will be judgements which needn't issue in 
actions and it is more fundamental because actions 
motivated by duty must be decided upon in accordance with 
a maxim which could be willed as universal law, i.e. actions 
motivated by duty must accord with a categorical imperative.
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It is this distinction between moral and amoral 
judgements upon which I shall, in fact, base the moral/ 
amoral distinction that I am seeking. The amoralist will 
be someone who does not make categorical imperative 
judgements. The making of categorical imperative judge­
ments will be related to the possession of a central 
belief in Chapter II where I shall also discuss the sense 
in which I shall use the terms 'categorical imperative' 
and 'hypothetical imperative' and its departure from Kant. 
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical 
imperatives and the variety of forms in which these judge­
ments appear will receive discussion in chapters II and 
III. In Chapter IV I shall discuss the extent to which 
categorical imperatives are used in moral judgements, 
and what sort of people dispense with them altogether.
In Chapter VI I shall look at some of the qualitative 
differences in the moral life between those who do make 
use of categorical imperatives and those that don't. 
Finally, in Chapter VI I shall consider some ways in which 
the use of categorical imperatives may be justified or 
challenged.
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CHAPTER II. THE DEFINITION OF CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
2.1. Aim of Chapter
The aim of this chapter is to provide a distinction 
between two types of practical judgements that I shall 
refer to as categorical and hypothetical imperatives.
Though these are Kantian terras, I shall not be using 
them in the Kantian sense, but in a sense in which they 
have come to be used in more recent philosophical literature. 
The differences between the modern sense and the original 
Kantian sense will be sketched.
An analysis of the terra 'categorical imperative* 
will then be undertaken so as to discuss, in Chapter IV, 
whether all, some, or no members of the speech community 
make use of such judgements; in Chapter V,any differences 
in behaviour that might be expected from a divergence in 
such language use; finally in Chapter VI, the justifica­
tion of the use of categorical imperatives. To these ends,
I could dispense with an analysis of the term 'categorical 
imperative' and simply stipulate the sense in which I 
intend to use it. Nevertheless, the enquiry does seem to 
take the form of an analysis. Although the term 'categorical 
imperative' is not part of the vernacular and there is no 
other with a similar meaning, the distinction between the 
two types of practical judgement does seem to be one with 
which all language users are conversant. No importance, 
however, is attached to the claim that there is a consistent 
modern use of the term and that I have captured it in my 
definition.
2.2. The Variety of Practical Judgements
I shall begin by looking at the term 'practical 
judgement'. These are judgements which are principally used 
to direct or guide action. The term is best illustrated by 
presenting the variety of grammatical forms such judgements 
take. Many practical judgements take the form 'X ought to 
0' where 'X ' stands for a person or group of persons and
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'0 ' is a description of an action or type of action.
Other typical verbs used in such judgements are 'should*, 
'must*, and *have to*, and there are a variety of similar 
forms such as 'X has an obligation to ^*, 'It is X's duty 
to 0', 'It would be best for X to 0*, 'It would be good 
for X to 0', 'It would be right for X to 0', More 
contentiously action-guiding are 'It would be honourable 
for X to 0*, * It would be courageous for X to 0', 'It 
would be detestable for X to 0',
As well as occurring in positive or negative form, 
in present or past tense, and in first, second or third 
person, there are also variations in generality and 
strength. Variations in generality can best be demonstrated 
by means of an example.
Take the following singular judgement:
(1) NL must answer this question truthfully now.
This may be generalised in the following ways:
(2) Everyone must answer this question truthfully now.
(3) NL must always tell the truth.
(4) Everyone must always tell the truth.
By variations in strength I mean variations in the 
extent to which the different verbs are action-guiding.
The examples given cannot consistently be ranked in order 
of strength, but three distinct grades, or logical types, 
can be discerned. Initially there is the case of pure 
evaluation and zero action-guiding force. Whether it is 
a possibility in cases of moral evaluation of actions such 
as 'It would be honest of X to 0' is a question to whichi 
shall return in 2.6. and 6.4. Next there is the case in 
which some action-guiding force is present, but not so as 
to exclude the possibility of further action-guiding force 
attaching to incompatible actions. And finally there is 
the case in which action-guiding force cannot attach to 
incompatible actions. There is some matching of these
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grades in ordinary language. 'Must*, 'have to*, and 'it 
would be best for' are invariably of the third type, so 
that 'X must 0' and 'X must not 0* are incompatible.
'Should' and 'ought to' are often of the second type,in 
which case 'X should 0' is compatible with 'X should not 
0*. Most verbs may appear in judgements of both second 
and third types.
It should be noted that not all judgements of the 
form 'X ought to 0' are practical judgements. There are 
also epistemic uses of 'ought' which have nothing to do 
with action-guiding and indicate merely expectation 
such as 'He must arrive soon', 'he ought to arrive around 
midday'•
It might also be thought that ought judgements could 
be made concerning not actions but interests or desires, 
such as 'you ought to be interested in politics', 'You 
shouldn't be addicted to heroin'. If such judgements are 
to make sense other than as purely evaluative, they must 
be construed as shorthand for 'You ought to take steps (or 
ought to have taken steps) to cultivate (or eradicate) that 
interest'•
I shall now discuss the division of practical judge­
ments into categorical and hypothetical imperatives, 
beginning with a look at Kant's use of the terms.
2.3» The Kantian Concept of Categorical Imperative.
Among the various descriptions Kant provides of these 
terms, unfortunately none is singled out as a definition. 
The following passage might be taken as most indicative!
'Hypothetical imperatives declare a 
possible action to be practically 
necessary as a means to the attain­
ment of something else that one wills 
(or that one may will). A categorical 
imperative would be one which 
represented an action as objectively 
necessary in itself apart from its 
relation to a further end.
translated by H.J. Paton, The Moral Law, 
Hutchinson, London, 1948, p.78
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Here a categorical imperative is distinguished 
from a hypothetical imperative in being unconditional
on the presence of some desire or purpose of the agent's.
But Kant also writes:
Finally, there is an imperative which, 
without being based on, and conditioned
by, any further purpose to be attained
by a certain line of conduct, enjoins 
the conduct immediately. This imperative 
is categorical. It is concerned, not with 
the matter of the action and its presumed 
results, but with its form and with the 
principle from which it follows ; and what 
is essentially good in the action consists 
in the mental disposition let the con­
sequences be what they may. This imperative 
may be called the imperative of morality*
op. cit. p.80
From this quote it appears that a categorical imperative 
is not only unconditional but also subject to a formal 
requirement. Tliis formal requirement is to be arrived at 
a priori and is embodied in the Formula of Universal Law, 
which Kaint introduces as follows:
There is therefore only a single categorical 
imperative and it is this: 'Act only on that
maxim through which you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal 
law. '
op. cit. p.84
From this last passage it appears that Kant is using 
the term 'categorical imperative' only for the Formula of 
Universal Law.
How then would Kant classify the variety of practical 
judgements that have been exhibited that are intended to hold 
unconditionally upon the existence of any desire or purpose 
of the prospective agent's? In discussing the possibility 
of the existence of a categorical imperative, Kant argues
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that it is never possible to demonstrate this by example.
He considers the case 'Thou shalt make no false promises' 
and argues that it can never be certain that action in 
accordance with such an imperative is motivated solely by 
the practical law of morality. From this it may be 
deduced that the principle 'Thou shalt make no false promises', 
is not to be regarded with any certainty as a categorical 
imperative, as it may have served merely as a pragmatic 
prescription. This does not,however,entail that the 
principle is a hypothetical imperative. Once having 
presented his Formula of Universal Law as an a priori cate­
gorical imperative, it is open to question whether Kant 
would have accepted the principles which satisfy this 
formula as themselves categorical imperatives.
Certainly there is a sense in which Kant uses 'categorical 
imperative' to mean the Formula of Universal Law. Exploring 
the possibility that there is a uense in which he uses the 
term to apply to certain practical judgements, the obvious 
candidates would be subjective principles such as 'Î ought 
never to tell a lie*, or universalised subjective principles 
such as 'Nobody ought ever to tell a lie* that satisfy the 
formula. Such principles might be regarded as categorical 
imperatives though there will be practical problems in 
applying the formula, namely in knowing how the subjective 
principle is to be universalis ed, and in knowing whether the 
universalised subjective principle could be willed as a 
universal law.
Next it would seem reasonable to regard as categorical
|:
imperatives those singular judgements such as *I ought not 
to tell a lie now' that can be derived from subjective 
principles that satisfy the Formula of Universal Law. But 
unless the judgement has actually been derived from such a 
principle, a considerable practical difficulty will exist in 
isolating a unique subjective principle from which the 
singular judgement could be derived.
1. Kant reserved the term objective principle for those
valid for every rational being, i.e. those that satisfy 
the Formula of Universal Law.
17.
So if there is a Kantian sense of * categorical 
imperative' that applies to certain practical Judgements, 
it will be difficult in practice to distinguish the 
categorical imperatives from the hypothetical imperatives. 
It would also appear, from the second of the passages 
quoted from Kant, that this concept of categorical 
imperative is serving as an answer,both to the question 
'What is a moral judgement'? and to the question 'What 
moral judgements are correct?' This would leave Kant no 
way of classifying the sincere judgements intended as 
unconditional that do not meet the requirements of the 
Formula of Universal Law, A consequentialist, for example, 
may in some circumstances judge that a person ought to 
tell a lie, or that a person would be permitted to commit 
suicide. For Kant, however, such judgements could not 
meet the requirements of the Formula of Universal Law, and 
so could not constitute categorical imperatives.
If the term 'categorical imperative* is to apply to 
practical judgement it is perhaps best to talce the 
unconditional requirement as distinguishing the categorical 
imperatives from the hypothetical imperatives that are true 
from those that sure false. It is certainly the 
unconditional feature of practical judgements that is 
central to the concept of categorical imperative as it is 
used in modern philosphical writing, eind it is this sense 
of categorical imperative that I intend to examine,
2.4. A Greunmatical Distinction
First, though, it will be of interest to look at the 
thought that categorical imperatives may be distinguished 
from hypothetical imperatives by the grammatical form in 
which they find expression, or at least that there is a 
connection between the distinction amd some grammatical 
distinction. The obvious grammatical distinction of 
relevance here is that between sentences of the form
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’X must (or should etc.) ^ ' and those of the form
'If C, X must ^ '. It might be thought that all sentences
of the first form express categorical imperatives whilst
all those of the second form express hypothetical imperatives
Yet this is easily shown not to be the case.
Many imperatives without conditional clauses are 
elliptical. When it said, for example, 'You must run', 
thinking someone wants to catch a train, this is clearly 
elliptical for 'If you want to catch the train you must 
run', which is immediately recognisable as hypothetical.
What it is that enables people to determine whether or not 
an imperative is elliptical is not itself a grammatical 
feature.
It can also be seen that not all imperatives with 
conditional clauses are hypothetical. For example, the 
imperative 'If you have borrowed money you must repay it' 
is normally thought of as categorical, equivalent to 'You 
must repay your debits,'
Hence the grammatical distinction is of no use in 
determining whether an imperative is categorical or 
hypothetical, though categorical imperatives will generally 
be expressed without a conditional clause,
2.5. The Withdrawal Definition of Categorical Irrrperative.
I shall now introduce a first formulation of the 
categorical/hypothetical imperative distinction as it is 
currently understood, I shall take as a representative 
judgement 'X ought to , where '0' is a description of a 
possible act, and 'X' is a name of a person, or pronoun.
The definition will apply to singular judgements, classed 
as 2,2, as of the second kind, in first, second or third 
person, present or past tense.
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Y* s judgement that X ought to 0 is a categorical imperative 
if and only if, Y would not withdraw his judgement if 0**ing 
were not conducive to the satisfaction of X*s desires, and 
Y knew this,
Y* s judgement that X ought to 0 is a hypothetical imperative 
if and only if, it is not a categorical imperative.
The classification of judgements into categorical and 
hypothetical imperatives thus depends solely on what the 
person making the judgement thinks about his judgement.
There is no overruling that person's own classification 
according to the above definition. The classification is 
also independent of the prospective agent's (ie, X's) belief 
as to whether or not the action would be conducive to the 
satisfying of his desires,
A vagueness may be thought to infect the distinction 
owing to the vagueness of the notion of desire. I shall 
be using the term 'desire*, unless otherwise specified, 
to mean 'present desire'. This will not apply just to 
appetitive desires with a particular phenomenological 
character such as hunger, but also to long-term projects 
and interests which need not be occurrent at the time one 
has them, such as a desire to keep one's weight down, or a 
desire to deepen one's command of a foreign language. The 
notion thus far sketched I shall call the narrow sense of 
desire. This will be extended to a broad sense of desire 
which covers desires that are attributable solely on the 
basis of a person's formation of an intention to act. This 
extra type of desire differs slightly from that which Nagel 
and McDowell describe as trivially attributable from the 
agent's being motivated to act, I have chosen to exclude 
cases of desires attributable on the basis of actions that 
are not intentional under any description i,e. involuntary 
actions, and include cases where the agent formed an 
intention to act but failed to act in accordance with that 
intention,either due to change of circumstances or to 
incontinence.
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As categorical imperative has been defined in terms_ 
of independence of present desires, this opens up the 
possibility that prudential judgements concerning a 
person's future welfare or happiness may sometimes be 
categorical imperatives. Kant believed that all prudential 
judgements were hypothetical imperatives as he believed 
that such judgements recommend certain actions as means to 
an end of personal happiness - which he took all men to 
have as a matter of natural necessity. Whether attribution 
of the end of personal happiness is the most natural way 
of explaining prudential judgements, or whether such an 
explanation is vacuous will be discussed when I come to 
consider the problems of distinguishing categorical 
imperatives from hypothetical imperatives in the domain 
of prudence. The role of the categorical imperative in 
prudence will receive attention primarily in so far as it 
throws light on the case of morality.
As the term 'desire' occurs essentially in the con­
sequent of a conditional in the definition of categorical 
imperative, it might be expected that the definition would 
yield differing classifications of judgements into hypo­
thetical and categorical imperatives according as the 
broad or narrow sense of 'desire' is chosen. This in fact 
will not be the case when the consequent is contrary to 
fact, rendering the conditional subjunctive. When the 
conditional is subjunctive, i.e. when Y does not know 
that 0-ing would not be conducive to the satisfying of 
X's desires, the definition can be read using the broad 
sense of desire, as this will be the easiest to apply.
If Y already knows that 0-ing is not conducive to 
the satisfaction of X's desires, then the conditional is 
material and the conditions under which the antecedent is 
true will be sensitive to the sense in which 'desire' is
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understood. If Y knows that 0-ing is not conducive to 
the satisfaction of X's desires in the broad sense, then 
this will hold a fortiori also for the narrow sense. Imagine 
now a situation in which 0-ing is not conducive to the 
satisfying of X's desires, when 'desire* is taken in the 
narrow sense but not in the broad sense. This would have 
to be a case in which X intends to 0 but 0-ing will further 
none of his long-term projects nor lead to the satisfying 
of any of his appetitive desires. It will be difficult to 
determine with any certainty when such situations obtain, 
and hence there will be few cases in which Y can be said to 
know such a fact. But even in these cases, it is 
inconceivable that Y's knowledge of such a fact would bring 
him to withdraw his judgement that X ought to 0. Hence there 
are no caaes in which the application of the definition of 
categorical imperative depends on whether the narrow or 
broad sense of 'desire' is chosen.
The definition of categorical imperative given above 
in terms of withdrawl is well-suited to cases in which overall OC 
judgements talcing all relevant information at hand into
Qvar^U,
consideration are on offer. In such cases it is X's ^ desire 
that is to feature in the definition. But it will be 
difficult to apply the definition in cases in which conflicting 
considerations validate contrary judgements i.e. when 'X 
ought to 0' and 'X ought not to 0' are both considered to 
be valid. In such cases it is any of X's desires that is to 
be understood in the definition. I shall therefore introduce 
an alternative definition that is more directly applicable 
and that will reveal the structure of an overall judgement.
2.6. The Reasons Definition of Categorical Imperative
To this end the putative analysis of *X ought to 0' 
as 'There exists reason for X's 0-ing' will be considered.
The proposed analysis seems insufficient in view of second 
and third person judgements concerning supererogation.
Here there is a typical moral reason for acting, yet the 
act would be considered beyond the bounds of the duty, and
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so it would not be judged that the man ought to do the 
act in question. The reasons analysis may also be 
adjudged insufficient because of cases in which the reason 
statement is weaker-than the ought statement. There are 
cases of this in which the reason is so weak as to be barely 
worth mentioning, such as a faint itch which provides a 
reason for scratching my ear. In this case there is no 
reason not to scratch, as the movement of my hand will not 
detract from anything else I have reason to do, yet it 
would be inappropriate to say that I ought to scratch. There
are also cases in which I have a reason to do something
which would conflict with an alternative course of action 
for which the reasons may be far better. And in these 
cases where the proposed action is easily over^ruled, 'ought* 
too may seem inappropriate. One might try to describe these
examples in such a way as to be able to treat them as excep­
tions, in order to formulate a vague sufficiency statement 
such as the following: 'there exists reason for X's 0-ing'
entails 'X ought to 0' provided that the reason is neither 
very weak, very strong, nor easily overridden. Untampered 
with, however, it must be conceded that 'there exists 
reason for X's 0-ing' is insufficient for *X ought to 0'.^* 
That the reasons statement is necessary for the ought 
statement, on the other hand, seems unchallengeable. A 
notion of 'ought' in which 'You just ought' could be a 
satisfactory answer to 'Why?' would be useless and difficult 
to understand.
Assuming then that 'X ought to 0* entails 'There 
exists reason for X's 0-ing*, a distinction between two 
types of reason will produce a distinction between two 
types of practical judgement. I shall introduce a distinction 
between intrinsic and non-intrinsic reasons by means of the 
following definition:
An intrinsic reason for X's 0-ing is one which is 
independent of X's desires.
1. 'There exists overall reason for X's 0-ing' is sufficient 
for 'X ought to 0'. For a definition of overall reason, 
see 3*5*
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or equivalently,
An intrinsic reason for X*s 0-ing is one whose specification 
contains no essential reference to X's desires.
The definition of intrinsic reason may also be shown
to be insensitive to the sense of 'desire' chosen. A
reason involving reference to desires in the narrow sense
will obviously be a reason involving reference to desires in
the broad sense. The reverse is also true since a reason, ,
involving reference to desires in the broad sense but not
in the narrow sense would have to be a reason based on a
desire that is attributable solely on the basis of an
intention to act. But this intention cannot have arisen
from a desire in the narrow sense, or such a desire would
occur essentially in the reason which ex hypothesi
involves no reference to desires in the narrow sense. Hence
the intention must have arisen from a reason, , that involves
no reference to desires in the narrow sense. But now there
seems to be nothing gained from the postulation of R^, as
there is no means available whereby it can differ appreciably
from R_, and no question to which it can provide an answer
1that would not also be answered by R^.
The definition of categorical imperative now appears 
as follows:
y's judgement that X ought to 0 is a categorical imperative 
if and only if, Y would judge that there existed intrinsic 
reason for X's 0-ing.
On this definition, the question of whether a judgement 
is a categorical imperative is fixed by the opinion of the 
person making the judgement. Though the question cfwhether 
something constitutes an intrinsic reason or not is 
independent of the opinion of the person making the judgement, 
it will be argued(in 2.9) that the question of whether Y 
believes that there exists intrinsic reason for X's action
1 The independence of intrinsic reasons ^ 0% desires is not
related to the question of temporal priority. A desire
may be attributed to someone on the basis of his forma­
tion of an intention,after coming to believe there 
exists intrinsic reason for him to act. But a person 
could also have a desire to 0, then come to see that 
there is also intrinsic reason for him to 0.
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cannot be answered in any significant way independently of 
Y's view of the matter. This accounts for the appearance 
of'Y would judge that...' in the definition instead of 'Y 
believes that....'
The definitions can easily be seen to be equivalent. If 
Y would judge that there is reason for X's 0-ing independent 
of X's desires, then he would not withdrawn his judgement if 
he came to know that 0-ing was not conducive to the satis­
faction of X's desires. Conversely, if Y judges that X 
ought to 0 and would not withdraw the judgement if he came 
to know that 0-ing was not conducive to the satisfaction of 
X's desires, then his belief that there is reason for X's 
0-ing would have to be a belief that there is intrinsic 
reason for X's 0-ing.
Before advancing it should be noted that some practical 
judgements are thought to contain elements of both hypothetical 
and categorical imperatives. On the above definition, a 
person is making a categorical imperative judgement when he 
would judge that there existed intrinsic reason for action, 
though he might also judge that there existed non-intrinsic 
reason as well. Thus a judgement designated categorical is 
one with some categorical element, but not necessarily 
purely categorical. The definition of a hypothetical 
imperative as a judgement that is made when a person would 
also judge that there existed non-intrinsic reason for 
action, could be regarded as a definition of a pure 
hypothetical imperative. A pure categorical imperative 
could be defined as a judgement that is made when a person 
would also judge that there existed intrinsic reason but no 
non-intrinsic reason for action.
Though it has been shown that the concept of categorical 
imperative does not pick up a vagueness due to the vagueness 
of the concept of desire, it does nevertheless suffer from a 
vagueness due to the difficulties facing Y, the person making
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judgement, in deciding on his secondary judgement required 
in applying the definition.
Though equivalent, the two definitions call for slightly 
different secondary judgements. The withdrawl definition 
asks Y to imagine how his original judgement would be 
affected under certain conditions, whereas tlie intrinsic 
reason definition asks Y to consider whether he would judge 
that there existed reason for X's 0-ing independent of X's 
desires. It is likely that whenever Y has a strong 
intuition about the question of dependence upon desires, 
he will immediately know whether he would withdraw his 
definition under the proposed conditions, I'v’hen intentions 
are not clear, the withdrawl definition may provide further 
chance of a secondary judgement by proposing a kind of 
thought-experiment in which Y tries to imagine the counter- 
factual situation obtaining. I shall examine the problems 
of applying the definitions by considering some examples, 
first moral, and then prudential,
2.7. Applications of the Definitions to Morality
If Y judges that X ought to 0 and Y doesn't believe 
that 0-ing would be conducive to the satisfaction of X's 
desires, then it is obvious that Y cannot believe that the 
reason for X's 0-ing depends on X's desires, so that the 
judgement 'x ought to 0* must be a categorical imperative.
The clearest cases of this type are those in which Y loiows 
that 0-ing would not be conducive to the satisfaction of 
X's desires. For example, I may judge that I ought to have 
visited my grandparents last summer, whilst knowing that 
at no time during that summer did I have any sort of desire, 
intention or pro-attitude towards visiting them. The 
clearest cases are often past tense first person judgements 
as in the example just given, though cases can arise in any 
person or tense. It might be disputed that first person
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present tense judgements'l ought to 0* can be made by 
someone with no desire to 0 and who forms no intention 
to 0, I will argue in 3*9 that there are cases of this 
type, though for the present purposes this in unimportant. 
Cases in which Y is not sure whether 0-ing would be conducive 
to the satisfaction of X's desires are principally second 
and third person judgements. For example, Y may judge that 
X ought to pay his grandparents a visit without knowing 
anything about X's attitude towards visiting his grandparents,
In the cases in which Y believes that 0-ing would be 
conducive to the satisfying of X's desires, in the broad 
sense (perhaps X has already 0'd) both hypothetical, and 
categorical imperatives are possible. It will be clear that 
the reason for X's 0-ing is independent of X's desires if 
the relevant desire arises after X has seen that there is 
reason for his 0-ing. But if the relevant desire arises 
before X has seen that there is reason for his 0-ing, the 
reason would be either dependent or independent of X's 
desires. There will be few cases in which temporal priority 
will help Y in classifying his judgement as a hypothetical 
or categorical imperative. In general, Y will know whether 
he takes the reason to be independent of X's desires. The 
most difficult cases arise when Y knows that 0-ing would 
be conducive to the satisfying of X's desires in the narrow 
sense. For example, I may judge that I ought to visit my 
grandparents, but because I enjoy visiting them, I don't 
know whether I'd judge that there existed intrinsic reason 
for visiting them. The withdrawal definition suggests that 
I imagine the counter-factual situation in which I have no 
desire in the narrow sense to visit, and try to decide 
whether I would withdraw my judgement. However, it may be 
that the difficulty I have in imagining myself without the 
relevant desire leads me to imagine a situation in which 
another person is substituted for myself. But this need
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not lead to the correct verdict unless certain 
universalisability constraints are accepted as attaching 
to categorical imperatives.
2.8. Applications of the Definitions^to Prudence
The task of distinguishing categorical from hypothetical 
imperatives is more difficult in the case of prudence. This 
is because the task of deciding whether the reason for 
action is independent of desires, which was the main 
problem in the moral case, is compounded by the problem 
of deciding when a desire exists (l shall now revert to 
writing^desire). Suppose, for exaunple, that my supply of 
coffee is on the point of running out and I judge that I 
ought to buy another jar. Assuming the entailraent from 
'ought* to 'reasons' holds good for prudential as well as 
moral reasons,it may be deduced that I believe there is 
reason for my buying a jar of coffee. Now the question 
arises as to whether the reason stems from my future desire 
to drink coffee that I am now quite certain will arise 
tomorrow at about 2.00 p.m., or whether the reason stems 
from my present desire that that desire due around 2.00 p.m. 
tomorrow should be satisfied along with a set of similar 
desires placed at equal regular intervals in the future, 
or whether the reason stems from my present desire simply 
to have a supply of coffee in the kitchen, or whether the 
reason stems from my desire for happiness. In the first 
case the reason for action would be intrinsic and the judge­
ment therefore a categorical imperative; in the next cases 
the reason would not be intrinsic, and the judgement accord­
ingly a hypothetical imperative. I
It is difficult to decide between these options because
there seem to be no firm criteria from which to judge, and
the choice seems rather unimportant except for the light
it could possibly throw on the corresponding choice in the
case of morality. The fourth of the above options should
iiL nort-iv*«rn,l
be rejected as conceptually unsound unless it can be shown, ^ 
when something counts as evidence that a person is not acting 
from a desire for happiness. The argument for intrinsic 
reasons often takes the form of an argument criticising the 
unnaturalness and implausibility of a desire for the
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satisfaction of ones future desires. The third option of 
a present desire to possess a supply of coffee in the 
above example, ,often appears the most apt of the
alternatives. Perhaps in the above example it would appear 
less natural to regard having a supply of coffee as one of 
ray long-term interests if my interest is only awakened when 
a particular appetitive desire occurs. On the other hand 
if I talce great delight in the appearance of ray kitchen 
with the coffee jar along with everything in their correct 
places on the shelves, then it might appear less natural 
to regard my reason for buying some coffee as a desire 
for the satisfaction of future desires, or as those future 
desires themselves. The relevant desire in this case is 
the present one that something be done about the empty jar 
of coffee. To take another example, the reason for my buying 
a piano did not seem at the time to be a desire to satisfy 
future desires to play whenever they should arise. Nor did 
it seem as though those future desires alone' gave me reason 
then for buying the piano. Rather it seemed as though the 
buying of a piano would be instrumental in serving the 
desire I then had to become as good a pianist as possible.
The future desires to play would not have existed with such 
frequency had not the means been available for their satis­
faction. This suggests another reason why future desires, 
directly or indirectly need not feature in a reason for 
action. Cases,muyexist in which no future desires would 
be expected if I do not now perform act A. So the fact 
that I would have desires which would be satisfied in 
the future if I now do A is insufficient for saying that 
those desires are my present reason for doing A.
Considering now the task of distinguishing categorical 
from hypothetical imperatives, the cases in which Y doesn't 
believe that 0-ing would be conducive to the satisfaction 
of X's present desires, when only the categorical imperative 
judgement is possible, are less easily recognised. The 
clearest cases would be those in which Y knows that 0-ing 
would not be conducive to the satisfaction of X's desires, 
and again these are most readily apparent in first person 
past tense judgements. For example, I may now judge that
S.
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I ought to have changed subjects at Cambridge ten years 
ago, knowing that there is no way that I could come 
to that conclusion based on my desires at that time, 
unless my desire for happiness is to be accepted.
Again it is probable that cases occur in any person and 
tense in which Y would claim that his judgement that X 
ought to 0 did not depend on X's desires. As an example 
of the case in which Y believes that 0-ing would be 
conducive to the satisfaction of X's present desires, and 
hence both categorical and hypothetical imperative are 
possible, tcilce my judgement that I ought to have a game 
of squash this week. There is clearly a desire to play 
based on the enjoyment that the game will bring me, plus 
a desire to get a fair amount of exercise. Yet if both 
these desires were absent, I might still make the judgement, 
based on an idea that I needed exercise. The problem of 
deciding whether my judgement is a categorical imperative, 
i.e. that it could be withdrawn if playing squash were not 
conducive to the satisfaction of any of my present desires, 
is compounded by the prior problem of deciding what are to 
count as present desires.
The definition of categorical imperative has been 
shown not to be sensitive to the sense of 'desire* chosen. 
Nevertheless, the practical task of distinguishing the two 
types of judgement is affected by the problem of recognising 
when a desire in the broad sense is present, and this is 
more difficult in the case of prudence than that of morality. 
The exhibiting of clear cases in which a judgement falls into 
the category of hypothetical or categorical imperative will 
be used in the following section, as well as facilitating 
the enquiry of Chapter IV as to the extent of the use of 
categorical imperatives in a speech community,and those 
of Chapter V and VI.
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2.9. Vagueness and Self-Deception
At this stage it is worth relating the conclusions 
reached so far to the problem mentioned in the introduction.
The central belief that distinguishes the moralist from 
araoralist is the belief in the existence of intrinsic 
reasons. The moralist/amoralist distinction may therefore 
be presented in terms of the distinction between assenters 
and non-assenters to the proposition ’there exist intrinsic 
reasons*. There are three stages at which vagueness may 
appear in the moralist/araoralist distinction. First, the 
proposition itself might be vague. I have,however, argued that 
this proposition does not pick up a vagueness from the 
vagueness of ’desire'. Secondly, there may be uncertainty 
as to the truth of the proposition,and hence vagueness in 
knowing what degree of certainty is to count as assent.
However, having presented a set of examples of categorical 
imperatives that are clearly distinguishable from hypo­
thetical imperatives, it ought to be obvious to anyone 
considering these examples, whether he would make such 
judgements himself. Hence there should be no difficulty in 
deciding whether or not to assent to the proposition 'there 
exist intrinsic reasons', and therefore no vagueness in the 
distinction between assenters and non-assenters. Thirdly, 
the distinction between assenters and non-assenters may be 
thought not to coincide with the distinction between believers 
and non-believers in intrinsic reasons owing to some form of 
8elf-deception.
In choosing Y's own opinion as to whether he believes 
that there exists that there exists intrinsic reason for 
Xi0-ing as determinant of whether his judgement is a 
categorical or hypothetical imperative, I claimed (in 2,6) 
that there is no other significant sense in which it can be 
said that Y believes there exists intrinsic reason. It is 
now time to defend that claim,and I shall concentrate 
primarily on the moral case. The claim can be challenged,
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either by denying that a person’s sincerely asserting 
that he believes that p is sufficient for attributing to 
him a belief that p, or by arguing that a contrary 
unconscious belief that not p can more or less annul the 
effect of a conscious belief that p. The former option is 
unattractive as it would involve challenging the 
intelligibility of the words Y uses to express what he takes 
to be a belief that p, either by imputing to him some other 
belief, or by denying that he is expressing a belief at all. 
It may be that this latter approach would be adopted by 
non-cognitivists such as Hare. ("He would claim that a person 
who takes the assertion X ought to 0 as equivalent to 
the expression of a belief *3 reason for X ’s 0-ing* 
misunderstands the use of moral language terras.) It would 
challenge.not the occasional assertion of a belief in the 
existence or inexistence of an intrinsic reason, but the 
view that anyone ever believes in the existence or 
inexistence of an intrinsic reason, by denying the 
intelligibility of the notion of intrinsic reason.
Tlie second and more plausible way of challening the
A
view that Y ’s own opinion is essential to an ascription to 
him of a belief in the existence of an intrinsic reason, 
is to argue that a contrary unconscious belief can coexist 
with the conscious belief. Only cases of unconscious beliefs 
conflicting with conscious beliefs need be considered since 
it is to be supposed, first, that the conscious belief is to 
be determined by what Y would sincerely judge if askedj( So 
there can be no cases in which Y has no belief merely 
because he has not thought about the situatioi^; and secondly, 
that Y cannot withhold judgement unless he has insufficient 
information about X ’s situation (But maybe he unconsciously 
knows all about XJ)
If Y ’s conscious belief is that there exists intrinsic 
reason for X ’s 0-ing,a contrary unconscious belief may be 
attributed to him by comparing his behaviour with other
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occasions on which, he has a conscious belief that there 
exists an intrinsic reason, and with occasions on which 
he has a conscious belief that there exists no intrinsic 
reason. Further evidence for an unconscious belief might 
be sought by comparing Y ’s behaviour with that of other 
people on the occasions in which they express a conscious beli( 
in the existence or inexistence of an intrinsic reason for 
action. This latter type of evidence might be adduced to 
claim that whenever Y has a conscious belief in the existence 
of an intrinsic reason, a contrary unconscious belief annuls 
its effect, i.e. that Y suffers from self-deception in 
assenting to the proposition ’There exist intrinsic reasons’. 
It is this systematic self-deception that is more plausible 
than isolated instances of self-deception.
I f  Y ’s conscious belief is that there does not exist 
intrinsic reason for X ’s 0-ing,a contrary unconscious belief 
may be attributed to him by comparison with his own behaviour 
and that of other people on occasions on which a belief in 
the existence or inexistence of an intrinsic reason is 
expressed. Again, the more plausible variety of self- 
deception would be systematic, in which Y claims that he 
never believes that there exist intrinsic reasons for action 
(i.e. doesn’t believe in intrinsic reasons). In such a case, 
the behavioural evidence for imputing to him unconscious 
beliefs in the existence of intrinsic reasons obviously cannot 
include comparison with occasions on which he has such beliefs 
consciously.
The behaviour cited as evidence for an unconscious belief 
will seldom be linguistic behaviour since, in general, Y ’s 
linguistic utterances can be expected to be consistent with 
his expression of the contrary conscious belief. It is 
primarily certain of Y ’s actions and feelings that will be 
taken as evidence for Y ’s possession of an unconscious belief 
in the e x i s t e n c e  of an intrinsic reason for action. And 
correspondingly it will be the absence of those actions and 
feelings that will suggest an unconscious belief in the 
inexistence of an intrinsic reason for action.
33.
Feelings that accompany thoughts about actions in the 
sphere of morality originate in complex ways through 
imitation of authoritative figures^ Freudian mechanisms 
such as the internalisation of parent’s standards and 
the acquisition of new motives in resolving the conflicts 
of the oedipal dilemmaj and conditioning and reinforcement 
ranging from the bestowal and withdrawal of affection to the 
administering of pleasures and pains. But the facts of Y ’s 
early psychological development will play a role anyway 
alongside his beliefs, in explaining his judgements, actions, 
and feelings* and there will be nothing gained from 
duplicating their role by introducing a further unconscious 
belief. If an unconscious mental state were to be postulated, 
it would be difficult to distinguish an unconscious belief 
that there is intrinsic reason for X ’s 0-ing from an uncon­
scious desire for X to 0.
Certainly it would be implausible to suggest that the 
existence of a set of feelings alone entailed the existence 
of a belief, as the phenomenon of residue guilt shows; The 
feelings associated with a belief that there is intrinsic 
reason t® act, e.g. in accordance with considerations of 
etiquette, drop away rapidly but not instantaneously after 
a person consciously abandons that belief. To postulate 
a rapidly waning unconscious belief to account for the 
residue guilt would seem unnecessary if not absurd. I shall 
therefore continue to take a person’s own testimony as the 
sole criterion of whether or not he believes in the existence 
of an intrinsic reason to act. The importance of this 
cognitive factor in accounting for his moral behaviour will 
be discussed in Chapter V.
2.10 An Objection to the Definition of Intrinsic Reason
The objection might be raised to the account of the 
distinction between two types of reasons for actions, as 
thus far presented, that the mere presence of a desire is 
not sufficient to guarantee the existence of a reason for 
an action which would be conducive to the satisfying of that
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desire. A property must be ascribed to the object, 
perceptible to the prospective agent, whereby it becomes 
intelligible that that object could be the object of a 
desire. This amounts to a demand for a desirability 
characterisation of the object in Anscorabe’s sense 
(intention ^37) It might then be claimed that the 
attribution of the property to the object may sometimes, 
if not always, serve as an intrinsic reason. The lack of 
firm criteria for deciding when this is so, indicates that 
the distinction may be too vague for the purposes for which 
it was intended.
Concerning the question of whether a desire needs 
amplifying with a desirability characterisation (i.e. a 
description of the object that provides a satisfactory 
answer to the question as to why the object was desired) 
in order for it to serve as a reason for action, it should 
first be remarked that Anscombe intended the possibility 
of finding a desirability characterisation to serve as a 
necessary condition for the putative desire to count as a 
desire. Once such a characterisation has been offered I 
see no reason why it should be denied that the desire provides 
a reason for action. The examples that might be advanced 
against this view, such as that of desiring another cigarette 
when trying to give up smoking, can easily be treated as 
cases where the desired object has something to render it 
desirable (such as that it would relieve irritation); and
i
thus the desire provides a reason for a c t i o n , ! though  ^ that' j
reason is easily overridden by a more serious reason for 
refraining from that action. *! ;l
As for the charge of vagueness, given that a desire 
requires the support of a desirability characterisation, it 
may be conceded that there is a vagueness concerning whether 
or not this desirability characterisation counts as an 
intrinsic reason. This renders vague some propositions of thet
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’There exists intrinsic reason for X ’s 0-ing’ owing 
to a vagueness in the word ’reason’. But because some 
of these propositions will be non-vague, the
general proposition 'There exist intrinsic reasons’ will 
remain non-vague.
2.11. Modification to the Definition of Intrinsic Reason
A modification has to be introduced into the distinction 
between intrinsic and non-intrinsic reasons, in order that 
certain desires that are considered morally relevant should 
be allowed to appear essentially in an intrinsic reason.
Mackie provides the example
You ought not to go in for school 
teaching if you are strongly attracted 
sexually to young children.
Ethics P.82, Penguin 1977
Here there is clearly a reading in which the judgement can 
be taken as a categorical imperative and yet the sexual 
desires of the agent, or the agent’s sexual interest,occur 
essentially in the reason for action. Following Mackie, 
this can be accommodated by modifying the definition of 
intrinsic reason to’that which is independent of any desire 
of the agent’s to whose satisfaction the recommended action 
would be cmducive. ’
Further modifications to the distinction begin to appear 
necessary however when one looks at categorical imperatives 
associated with duties towards the self, It might, for 
example, be said of an overworked doctor that he ought to 
take a rest for the sake of his own health. This could be 
intended as a categorical imperative despite the fact that his 
own good health is certainly something that he desires. The 
definition yields the correct result,as the reason would be 
said to exist even if the doctor had no desire to protect 
his health.
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If the desire in question cannot be regarded as a 
need but is particular to the individual, including his 
more mundane interests, the case is rather more difficult 
to accommodate. Suppose, for example, that a tennis 
enthusiast, non professional, has been practising for some 
local tournament he has entered and has been greatly looking 
forward to it. Then on the opening day, he remembers an 
invitation to a family wedding, at which his presence will 
be expected, and which, if he attends, will cause him to be 
scratched from the tournament. A friend might advise him to 
forget the wedding. Here the judgement 'You ought to play 
in the tournament* could be meant categorically, yet the 
reason for playing contains essential reference to a basic 
interest of his which would be furthered by the proposed 
action (provided that guilt and worry would not destroy 
his prospects of enjoyment). If the agent did not have 
this interest in tennis, the reason would not exist. What 
we have here is a complex reason for action constructed 
from two reasons, one intrinsic and one non-intrinsic, 
both of which, taken alone, could underlie an ought judgement, 
It is important that the non-intrinsic reason is asserted to 
be dominant as the same problem does not occur when the 
balance is reversed. If it is asserted that he ought to 
attend the wedding in preference to the tournament, then a 
full specification of the reason will contain reference to 
his desire to play tennis. Here the desire is thwarted by 
the action that is urged, so this example escapes misclassifi­
cation on account of the first modification. It may also 
escape on account of a direct application of the original 
definition. If the person did not have the desire to play 
tennis, the judgement very obviously would not be withdrawn.
To accommodate such caaes as the first judgement given 
in association with the tennis example, an intrinsic reason 
could be redefined as that which contains a partial reason 
which is independent of any present desire of the prospective 
agent!s to whose satisfaction the recommended action would be 
conducive.
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A partial reason may be defined as any part of the whole 
reason that could constitute a reason for an action by 
its elf.
Further examples not captured by either of these 
modifications might be constructible in which a person has 
several desires and it is judged of him categorically that 
he ought to satisfy one in prference to others which in ^
fact he would prefer to satisfy. Or it might be that 
someone has a desire but would prefer not to satisfy it 
in a way that someone judges categorically that he ought. 
Perhaps these cases are assimilable. An example of the 
second type might be something like 'If you enjoy 
mathematical manipulations you ought to become a mathematics 
teacher in a comprehensive school.'
As an example of the first kind, consider someone with 
two desires, which are in fact great interests of his such 
as horse riding and medicine. Suppose he has the ability 
to become a professional jockey or a doctor but has not 
the time to do both. Someone might judge of him that he 
ought to become a doctor, even though his preference is for 
becoming a jockey. Suppose, also that it is not his ability 
alone that prompts the judgement, and that it would be 
withdrawn if he didn't also have some interest in medicine.
Now, the intrinsic reason that it is being claimed exists 
for the person's becoming a doctor contains essential 
reference to his desire to pursue medicine. As there is a 
desire to whose satisfaction the recommended action would be 
conducive, this example escapes correct classification after 
the first modification to the definition of categorical 
imperative. But is it correctly classified after the second 
modification? Is there any partial reason independent of 
the troublesome desire to pursue medicineî In this case his 
ability to, become a doctor can be taken as the partial 
reason even though it doesn't suffice on its own as a
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reason in an overall judgement, so the threat of a 
counter-example has been removed. The concept of a 
partial reason will receive further elaboration in the 
next chapter.
2,12 Comparison of Definitions of Modern Writers.
It may be helpful to conclude this chapter by 
comparing my distinction between intrinsic and non-intrinsic 
reasons that I take to underlie the distinction between 
categorical and hypothetical imperatives, with those of 
McDowell, Williams, Foot, Mackie and Nagel. The term 
intrinsic reason is borrowed from Mackie eind used in the 
same sense as he uses it, except for the final modification 
mentioned above. The distinction stripped of the two 
modifications given above matches exactly that between 
external and internal reasons given by Willieims (internal 
ard External Reasons, R. Harrison (ed.) Rational Action; 
Studies in Philosophy and Social Science. P.17)
Nagel draws a distinction between objective reasons and 
subjective reasons in^THe Possibility of Altuism^which he 
later renames as a distinction between impersonal and 
personal reasons. He defines an impersonal reason as one 
which can be given a general form which does not include an 
essential reference to the person to whom it applies (Lecture 
I on Ethics delivered at Princeton 1979, p.6) Personal 
reasons he then takes as either autonomous, stemming from 
the agent's desires, or deontological, stemming from the 
claims of individuals ' with whom he has particular bi-
j'
personal relations. (Lecture II, p.3)* Nagel's definition
I
of personal, autonomous reasons thus corresponds to my 
unmodified definition of intrinsic reasons.
Foot's final conclusion (in 'Morality as a System of 
Hypothetical Imperatives', Philosophical Review LXXXI 1972) 
as to a definition that would allow moral judgements to be 
classed as categorical and the judgements of etiquette as
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hypothetical is probably best derived from her statement,
Considerations of etiquette do not have any
automatic reason-giving force,. by contrast,
it is supposed that moral considerations 
necessarily give reasons for acting to any 
man.
op. cit. p .309
As she talks of the possibility of statements and judgements 
as well as considerations as giving reasons for acting, some 
may interpret her as claiming that categorical imperatives 
are statements that themselves necessarily give reasons for 
acting to any man. As McDowell and Phillips point out, 
anyone thinlcing that his statement 'You should do this* itself 
gives reason to act,could not consistently see himself 
challenged by the retort 'Why should I?* He would be 
reduced to answering 'You just should*. Few people see such 
imperatives as themselves giving reason for action in this 
way. Even in the case of a command, the reason for obeying 
it is not the command itself, but more plausibly a fact 
concerning not just the command but also the relations of 
authority between the person issuing the command and the 
person receiving it.
It is more likely that Foot means to take a categorical 
imperative as a statement that expresses that there are 
considerations which necessarily give reason for acting to 
any man. The phrasing of this . indicates that she takes 
general judgements as central. The interpretation of her use 
of ' categorical imperatives,' here depends on the sense in 
which she uses 'necessarily*. If it can be conceded that 
* considerations that necessarily give reason* may be replaced 
by 'fact that constitutes intrinsic reason'and that her 
account may be extended to cover particular judgements , then 
it will match that which I have offered. (I shall argue in 
the next chapter that Foot was mistaken in supposing that on 
this definition the judgement of etiquette would be rendered 
hypothetical imperatives.)
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McDowell introduces a distinction between hypothetical 
and non-hypothetical reasons for action as follows;
We have then an apparent contrast between 
two ways in which an agent's view of how 
things are can function in explaining his 
actions. In one, exemplified by the case 
of taking one's umbrella, the agent's belief 
about how things are combines with an 
independently intelligible desire to represent 
the action as a good thing from the agent's 
point of view. In the other, a conception of 
how things are suffices on its oim to show us 
the favourable light in which the action 
appeared.
Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical 
Imperatives?in P.A.S.S. 1978. p.22.
This contrast can be extended to cover a prospective 
agent's view of an action whether or not he eventually 
performs it, and to a person's view of other people's 
potential or realised actions. A hypothetical imperative 
then becomes a judgement expressing the existence of a 
conception of the circumstances which together with a 
suitable desire constitutes a reason for action. A 
categorical imperative becomes a judgement expressing the 
existence of a conception of the circumstances which by 
itself constitutes a reason for action.
From this passage it can be seen that McDowell takes 
a conception of how things are as basic and as constituting 
a non-hypothetical reason, and then defines ein 
independently intelligible desire which is to serve in a 
hypothetical reason, derivatively or secondarily. This 
reverses the order of priority that I chose. I took the 
concept of desire as basic and defined an intrinsic reason 
as one which could be specified without reference to desires 
in the broadest sense of the term. McDowell's phrase 'a 
conception of how things are' is misleading for it offers no 
hint as to whether desires should in general be excluded 
from the conception, and as to the type of desires that may 
be included. The phrase 'independently intelligible desire'
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likewise could be misleading because it would seem to 
exclude desires that are triggered off by an agent’s 
conception of the situation. For example, a person’s 
desire for an ice cream may not be intelligible 
independently of a conception of the situation that that 
person forms after hearing two and a half bars of Rudolf 
the Red—nosed Reindeer. Such desires are often 
unintelligible independently of a person’s belief that 
the means are available to satisfy that desire. Until
the notion o f ’a conception of the situation* has been
further refined, it would have to be talc en to include 
such means/end facts. But this would sometimes render non­
hypo thetical a person’s reason for buying an ice cream which
would commonly be regarded as a paradigmatic, case of a hypo­
thetical reason. Thus I conclude that McDowell’s 
distinction between hypothetical and non-hypothetical 
reasons makes use of a misleading conceptual priority of 
reasons over desires, and thus misses his intended mark.
4!r
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CHAPTER III. THE VARIETIES OF REASON AND THEIR 
ONTOLOGICAL STATUS
3.1. Aim of Chapter.
The analysis of categorical imperatives of the 
previous chapter dealt with variations of tense and 
person but very little mention was made of variations 
of generality and strength. In this chapter the relation 
between singular and general judgements will be discussed 
along with the relation between all-things-considered 
judgements and judgements made about an aspect of the 
situation, concerning what I called ’partial reasons’.
To facilitate this suialysis I shall first undertake an 
enquiry into the type of entity with which the reasons are 
to be identified, i.e. the ontological status of intrinsic 
and non-intrinsic reasons. This will also serve as an 
essential prelude to an assessment of Mackie’s argument 
from queerness against the existence of intrinsic reasons.
3.2. The Aristotelian Syllogism
In examining what type of entity the reasons are to be 
identified with I shall look first at Aristotle’s doctrine 
of the practical syllogism. Reasoning is represented by 
Aristotle as a consideration of two premisses which together 
yield a conclusion. In the case of theoretical reason the 
conclusion is a proposition which must be believed if the 
major and minor premisses are believed and there is no 
other theoretical syllogism whose premisses are believed 
that leads to a contrary conclusion. In the case of a 
practical syllogism the major premiss is a universal 
proposition connecting some clearly non-evaluative 
predicate with a predicate which>is evaluative'or indicates 
suitability for potential agents of a certain type, e.g. 
dry food suits any man. The minor premiss is a fact or 
set of facts indicating the obtainability of whatever was
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mentioned in the major premiss. Then, if the person 
deliberating is of the type indicated in the major premiss 
as suited to the thing in question (and this may be 
mentioned explicitly in the minor premiss), he will arrive 
at the conclusion that in the absence of a syllogism leading 
to a conflicting conclusion, is an intention to act, which 
barring incontinence will result in action.
Looking to the practical syllogism for an identification 
of the reason presupposed in judgements of the form ‘X ought 
to 0* f it would seem that neither premiss alone could 
constitute a reason, and that the only option available 
would be to identify the reason with a combination of major 
and minor premisses.
As the practical syllogism is offered.as an explanation 
of action and as an account of the process of deliberation 
leading to action, it is designed to apply when the agent 
believes the premisses and has deliberated accordingly. For 
a complete discussion of reasons presupposed in judgements 
of the sort 'X ought to 0*, cases where X does not believe 
the premisses or where the premisses are false would need 
to be considered.
The doctrine of the syllogism cein presumably be extended 
to cover those syllogisms which might be contemplated by 
someone who does not, in fact, believe or know the premisses, 
and also to cover syllogisms with false premisses that are 
sometimes acted upon or at least deliberated upon.
The doctrine of the practical syllogism,however,contains 
no mention of a distinction which could be used to separate 
intrinsic from non-intrinsic reasons. In Aristotle’s 
examples, a desire in the broad sense engages with the object 
mentioned in the major premiss unless there is a conflicting 
syllogism. The doctrine could easily be extended to cases 
where there is no such engaging. But to isolate intrinsic 
reasons, a way of distinguishing major premisses that apply 
whether or not the object is desired in the broad sense is 
needed. The obvious way to do this would be to include 
reference to the potential agent’s desire in one type of 
reason. But the combination of major and minor premisses
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of an Aristotelian syllogism can contain no mention of 
anything’s being desired. Hence Aristotle’s account of 
practical reasoning is of little service for the purpose 
at hand.
3*3* Explanatory and Guiding Reasons.
Making a fresh start in searching for an identification 
of reasons, I shall begin with the non-intrinsic, or 
hypothetically imperative reasons. Assuming it has been 
granted that all genuine desires yield reasons (at least 
partial reasons) for action, it would most obviously be 
said that there exists reason for X ’s ^-ing, and X ought to 
9^, when 0-ing would lead to the satisfaction of one of X ’s 
desires, and X Icnows this. But what if 0-ing would lead 
to such satisfaction but X does not know this? In such 
cases the ought statement entails the reason statement as 
expected. An example can be found in a person’s desire to 
recover from a particular ailment. It would be said that 
there is reason for him to take penicillin (say) and that 
he ought to take penicillin if this would cure him, even if 
he is unaware of the effects of the drug.
Now what if X merely believes that 0-ing will lead to 
the satisfaction of his desires when in fact it will not? 
Here I think the ought judgement inappropriate. A person 
would, for example, think that he had been wrong in judging 
that he ought to go to the Albert Hall on discovering that 
the Promenade Concert he was interested in was to be held 
at the Roundhouse. Similarly he would not expect others to 
judge that he ought to go to the Albert Hall, or to tell him 
to do so merely on account of his misapprehension. But in 
both these cases it would be acknowledged that the person 
with the mistaken belief did have reason to act the way he 
did, despite it being contrary to his interests. In such 
cases, the ought statement -’He ought to have gone to the 
Albert Hall’ appears not to entail the reason statement 
’He had reason to go to the Albert Hall.’
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This complexity can be accommodated by way of a 
distinction between X ’s reasons, the reasons that may be 
invoked to explain an action,and the reasons, the reasons 
whose existence is presupposed in ought-judgements• As 
such judgements may sometimes be used to guide action,
I shall refer to these reasons as guiding reasons.
Explanatory reasons may now be identified with some desire 
of X ’s combined with his belief that 0-ing will lead to the 
satisfaction of his desire. Guiding reasons may be identified 
with X ’s desire combined with the fact that 0-ing will lead 
to its satisfaction. This differs from the major and minor 
premisses of a practical syllogism in taking X ’s desire for 
an object as opposed to some statement indicating the 
desirability of objects of that type, and in taking a belief 
or fact that 0-ing leads to the satisfaction of that desire 
as opposed to a simple statement that 0-ing is an available 
option. It is natural now to stipulate ’X has reason to
when explanatory reasons are available, and keep * There
 ^ f
exists reason for X ’s 0-ing for guiding reasons. This also 
preserves the entailment from ’X ought to 0 ’ to ’There is 
reason for X ’s 0-ing’, whilst denying the entailment from 
’X ought to 9^ ’ to ’X has reason to 0 ’. As has been shown, 
there is no entailment either way between ’X has reason to 
0 ’ and ’There exists reason for X ’s 0-ing’.
Though it has been shown that there is in general no 
entailment from ’There is reason for X ’s 0-ing’ to ’X ought 
to 0*, there are no cases with non-intrinsic reasons where 
there exists reason for X ’s 0-ing which would count as 
demanding too much of X for the judgement ’X ought to 0 ’ to 
be asserted of him, corresponding to cases of superogation 
with intrinsic reasons. Hence the entailment holds for 
all but the cases where the reason is so slight that even 
in the absence of einy conflicting reasons, the corresponding 
ought judgement would not be used, and the cases where 
the reason is easily overridden.
1 See note p.22
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I shall now examine these logical relations between 
statements with regard to intrinsic reasons. The same 
distinction between guiding reasons and explanatory reasons 
can be applied. The two parts of the guiding reason can 
be telescoped into a fact that by itself constitutes a 
reason for action. Likewise, the explanatory reason will 
be a single belief about some feature of the situation.
It might seem, however, that there are cirucms tances 
under which false propositions may constitute intrinsic 
reasons for a person’s acting. A person confronted by a 
beggar might come to believe the proposition that the 
begger is hungry and penniless. Consequently, it might 
be said that this proposition constitutes a reason for 
the person to give the beggar some money, and hence that 
there exists reason for the person to give money, and that 
he ought to give money. Intuititions are probably divided 
as to whether these last two statements should be withdrawn 
if, unlcnown to the agent, the episode turns out to be 
the prank of some quite wealthy person disguised as a 
beggar. If it is thought that they should not be withdrawn, 
the reason for giving money could be identified with a 
fact involving the man's appearing to be a hungry penni­
less beggar. I believe it would be possible to construe 
all such cases in terms of facts about the appearance of 
the situation.
As with non-intrinsic reasons, ’X has reason to 0 ’ 
does not entail ’There exists reason for X ’s 0-ing*, other­
wise it could be said that X ’s belief concerning some feature 
of the situation, no matter how strange or repulsive, 
could constitute an intrinsic reason for him to act. 
Similarly, 'X has reason to 0* does lot entail ’X ought to 
0 ’ in cases in which the explanatory reasons are neither 
supererogatory nor extremely weak, otherwise it could be 
said that X ought to 0 whenever he believed that he ought 
to 0, no matter how strange or repulsive that belief.
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The entailment from *X ought to 0' to ’There exists 
reason for X ’s 0-ing* was argued for with regard to reasons 
in general, and so the same argument applies a fortiori 
for intrinsic reasons. However, the reverse entailment 
in non-exceptional cases may be thought not to hold. To 
take Mackie’s example, if it is to be supposed that the 
fact that someone is starving at your doorstep is a reason 
for doing something about it, it would seem that this is 
insufficient to say that you ought to do something about 
it, without adding a further condition, indicating that 
this fact could be known. This oddity may be acknowledged 
as a special property of intrinsic reasons, or it may be 
thought preferable to preserve the parallel between non- 
intrinsic and intrinsic reasons by requiring that the fact 
specify the prospective agent’s role in the situation.
This would mean rejecting such a fact as that someone is 
starving at X ’s doorstep as a reason for X ’s acting, unless 
it is filled out with some mention of X ’s position at the 
time. Mackie’s other example, ’someone is writhing in agony 
before your eyes’ would satisfy this requirement on facts 
which are to constitute reasons for action.
On the other hand, it might be thought that as the 
entailment from ’There is reason for X ’s 0-ing’ to ’X ought 
to 0 ’ does not in general hold, it will not matter how the 
entailment fairs in the non-extreme cases, and hence that 
it is perfectly acceptable to talk of facts which may 
constitute intrinsic reasons for X ’s 0-ing independently 
of X ’s knowledge of the circumstances. Following this line
i
of thought, the entailment from ’There exists reason for X ’s 
0-ing*to ’X has reason to 0 ’ fails, as in the case of non- 
intrinsic reasons, emd the remaining entailment from ’X 
ought to 0 ’ to ’X has reason to 0* can be seen to fail tod. 
For it would certainly not be wished that ’X ought to 0 ’
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entailed 'X believed there existed reason for his 0<-ing’_ 
which would be a consequence of the prima facie plausible 
entailment from 'X has reason to 0* to ‘X believes there 
exists reason for his 0-ing* to be discussed shortly. If 
this line of thought is to be adopted, the six entailments 
that may be constructed from * X ought to 0*, * There is
reason for X* s 0-ing* and *X has reason to 0* are all 
invalid except for that from *X ought to 0* to ’There is 
reason for 0-ing*, and this pattern holds for both 
intrinsic and non-intrinsic reasons.
3*4. Are Intrinsic Reasons Linguistically Expressible?
I shall consider now the entailment that was used 
unsupported above from ’X has reason to 0* to *X believes 
there exists reason for his 0-ing*. This is a particular 
instance of the more general entailment that if there are 
facts that constitute intrinsic reasons for action, then 
it follows that anyone believing such a fact must also 
believe that it does constitute intrinsic reason for action. 
Suppose that the entailment holds, and that * a man is 
starving in front of X ’s eyes' constitutes an overall 
intrinsic reason for X to help the starving man. Now if X 
believes the fact, he must ex hypothesi also believe there 
is reason for him to help the starving man. If he then 
does not help he must be convicted of acting irrationally, 
an indictment that few find appropriate for the immoral man. 
If this conclusion is deemed unsatisfactory one of the 
premisses of the argument must be rejected. Suppose this 
to be the premiss that if X believes the fact, he must 
also believe there is reason for him to help. Then X ’s 
belief of the fact could not suffice as an explanatory 
reason for his action were he to help. If more were needed 
for a person to see reason to act than just a belief about 
some feature of the circumstances, then more would be 
needed by way of an explanatory reason.
1. For a definition of 'overall reason’ see 3*5*
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The more favourable alternative is to accept that 
anyone believing a fact that constitutes a reason for 
action must also believe that it does constitute a reason 
for action. Then the other premiss must be repeated, namely 
that 'a man is starving in front of X*s eyes' constitutes 
an intrinsic reason for X to help. Assuming that there 
are overall intrinsic reasons, and that one is in the 
offing in this example, what can it be? The reason cannot 
just be a conjunction of the fact that a man is starving 
in front of X's eyes with the further fact that this con­
stitutes a reason for action, as this would involve a 
form of self—referential incoherence. A final alternative 
is to reject the sentence * a man is starving in front of 
X's eyes' as an expression of the fact that constitutes 
intrinsic reason, and as the argument would apply to any 
similar sentence, to reject any linguistic expression of 
such facts,
McFetridge explores one way of making sense of the 
idea of facts that cannot be linguistically characterised, 
namely by analogy with perceptual states.
We think of perceptual states as cognitive, 
as capable of representing how things are, 
while allowing that how, exactly, they 
represent things to be may exceed our 
capacity to state.
Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical 
Imperatives? in P.A.S.S. 1978. p.37
He then appears to put paid to this suggestion,by 
adducing the evidence that agents frequently see circumstances 
as demanding a certain action from them after merely having 
been told of those circumstances. Platts explains this 
whilst holding onto the perceptual analogy by means of a 
distinction between concepts and conceptions^ Two people 
may agree on the facts of the situation yet disagree as to 
whether those facts constitute a reason for acting. Th$.s
1 'Moral Reality and the End of Desire' in 'Reference, Truth 
and Reality' in M.Platts ed. R.K.P. 1980 t
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Platts would attribute to difference in depth of conception 
of some central concept appearing in the facts of the case 
i.e. to a difference in recognitional capacities of instances 
of the concept. So in both MacDowell and Platts, the 
intrinsic reason is to be identified with a fact about the 
situation. For McDowell (in 'Are Moral Requirements 
Hypothetical Imperatives?') this fact cannot be expressed 
in a sentence. For Platts, it can, though knowledge of 
the fact cannot be infallibly transmitted linguistically.
It is probably as a response to McFetridge's suggestion 
that a conception of a situation should be capable of 
linguistic expression that McDowell has developed his views 
into a two-tier system in'virtue and Reasoni At the first 
stage, the agent's conception of how to live manifests 
itself in the perception of a salient fact in a situation, 
this salient fact selecting one of the agent's concerns.
The concern and salient fact then act as major and minor 
premiss in a practical syllogism. In seeing the fact as 
salient, the agent sees it as a reason for acting which 
silences all others.
Perhaps it will be possible on McDowell's view to fully 
formulate both major and minor premisses linguistically.
What will not be formulable is the agent's conception of how 
to live which cannot be understood from an external stand­
point.
Any attempt to capture it in words will 
recapitulate the character of the 
teaching whereby it might be instilled. 
Generalisations will be approximate at 
best, and examples will need to be taken 
with the sort of "and so on" which 
appeals to the co-operation of a hearer 
who has cottoned on.
Virtue and Reason P.19 
The Monist 1979
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Thus it is explained how different people's conceptions 
of how to live cannot be understood without being shared, 
yet the particular fact which a person sees as giving 
reason to act may be believed by someone else who does 
not see it as giving reason to act. This explains how 
someone may see reason to act after merely being told of 
the situation, which, as McFetridge pointed out, constituted 
a problem for the view that a conception of the situation 
which by itself gave reason to act was analogous to a 
perceptual state.
It may appear that McDowell' means to identify the 
conception of the situation with the prospective agent's 
belief about the situation when he writes 'a conception of 
how things are suffices on its own to show us the favourable 
light in which the action appeared'. This is only because 
the quoted passage refers to an act which the agent has 
performed. To explain an act ex post facto, it is obviously 
insufficient to give a fact constituting a reason for the 
act without including the agent's belief of that fact. When 
McDowell's contrast is extended (in the manner suggested in 
2,12) to cover cases in which Y is viewing the potential 
actions of X, a conception that suffices as a reason for 
X's action need only be regarded as a fact about the situation, 
not necessarily believed by X. I argued (in 2,12) that 
McDowell's notion of a conception of a situation that by 
itself constitutes a reason for action, was insufficiently 
spelled out to indicate the circumstances under which it 
may include desires. From now on, whenever I use this 
expression, it will be in the sense of 'fact that constitutes 
an intrinsic reason for action. And in interpreting McDowell 
it should be borne in mind that he uses the expression both 
to mean 'fact that by itself constitutes reason for action* 
and to denote someone's belief of such a fact.
It will be convenient to use both accounts of McDowell's 
as the second is an elaboration upon rather than a
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renunciation of the first. What McDowell initially 
regarded as a conception of the situation which 
constituted a reason to act but could not be linguistically 
formulated, is later split into a salient fact and concern 
which constitutes reason to act, and which can be 
linguistically formulated. As it is the conception of how 
to live that selects the particular fact as salient, this 
cannot be left out of the equation.
Though McDowell has in mind the virtuous person when 
talking of the agent's conception of how to live, it should 
be remarked that this type of explanation, if applicable at 
all, will apply equally to those whom the virtuous person 
would regard as having a slightly or indeed very warped 
conception of how to live. This is just an iteration 
of the familiar argument from relativism, with which any 
defense of intrinsic reason must deal. And it is also worth 
pointing out that on this view access to the requirements 
of morality is only gained through an elaborate training 
and self-education.
It is an important claim of McDowell's that someone 
need not manifest irrationality in failing to see reason 
to act as morality requires. By failure to see reason to act, 
I take McDowell to mean failure to come to the belief that 
there is reason for him to act.
Failure to see reason to act virtuously 
stems, not from the lack of a desire 
on which the rational influence of moral 
requirements is conditional but from the 
lack of a distinctive way of seeing ij> r 
situations. : -
Op. cit P. 23
This point is contested by Williams:
What is it that one comes to believe when 
he comes to believe that there is reason 
for him to 0, if it is not the proposition, 
or something that entails the proposition 
that if he deliberated rationally, he i 
would be motivated to act appropriately?
Op. cit. P.24 I
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McDowell would have to reply, I think, that it is that 
given a suitably developed perceptual capacity or con­
ception of how to live, an agent would be motivated to 
act appropriately if he deliberated rationally. An 
agent with this sort of perceptual capacity would certainly 
be motivated to deliberate, contrary to Williams* thought 
(op. cit. p.24),by his desire to find the right act in the 
circumstances, this desire being trivially attributable 
as a result of a belief of his about the world. McDowell 
would probably agree with Foot and Williams in taking 
claims that rationality may impose demands upon a prospective 
agent irrespective of his desires, as bogus or bluff. To 
support McDowell's position, the acquisition of the perceptual 
capacity still needs justification, as does the special 
status of the virtuous person's conception above all the 
near-misses and totally non-virtuous conceptions, to which 
I shall return in Chapter VI,
In conclusion, an intrinsic reason for action is to be 
identified with a fact that is either non-linguistically 
expressible, or it is linguistically expressible but is 
only recognised as an intrinsic reason for action by those 
with some special conception of how to live, or special 
perceptual capacity which itself is not linguistically 
expressible (like someone's driving style). In the moral 
case this fact will be a statement about the desires or 
needs of someone other than the agent, or a statement implying 
the presence of such desires or needs. In the prudential 
case it will be a statement about, or implying the presence 
of, some future desire or need of the agent. The possibility 
of further categorical imperatives that are neither moral 
nor prudential will be discussed in 3.11. '
3* 5* Overall and Conclusive Reasons
Returning to the question of the variation of strength 
of categorical imperatives, it was remarked in 2.2.that 
there are a host of linguistic forms which reflect different 
degrees of strength but whidh cannot consistently be ranked 
in order of strength. The analysis in terms of reasons
vW
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applies to all of these. The reason for action may be very 
wealc and easily overriden, extremely strong and unlikely to 
be overriden, or anywhere between these extremes. In all 
cases the judgement will be taken as implying that there 
exists a fact about the situation which constitutes a 
reason to act. The analysis of reasons thus far as facts 
about the situation is well suited to accommodate cases 
where different reasons for and against a given action coexist. 
In such cases, different reasons are just facts about 
different aspects of the situation. The existence of reasons
of this type is what is claimed to be asserted in a
/
categorical imperative of what I chose in 2.2. to call the 
second kind.
The reason asserted to exist in an imperative of the 
third kind must, however, take all aspects of the situation 
into consideration and I shall call it a conclusive reason.
The idea of an all-things-considered fact about the 
situation which is capable of being conceived and hence 
perhaps believed, is a far more recondite notion than an 
ordinary fact about the situation since there is no way of 
capturing it linguistically. However, since the ordinary 
facts under consideration have turned out not to be 
linguistically expressible on McDowell's first view, this 
constitutes no further objection to the analysis. On 
McDowell's second view, the fact that is singled out as 
salient by the conception of how to live is well-suited to 
be a conclusive reason, since other reasons have been 
overridden in selecting one fact as salient. It is more 
problematic on McDowell's second view to account for 
judgements concerning obligations that are easily overridden 
and to account for moral conflicts.
A judgement which is the best in the circumstances, i.e 
that takes all things at hand into consideration,may have 
been arrived at after balancing judgements of the second 
kind; Eind thus can be regarded as a composite judgement. I 
shall refer to such all-things-at-hand-considered judgements 
as overall judgements, and the reasons for action whose 
existence they entail, I shall call overall reasons.
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Overall judgements may be compatible with conflicting 
ought judgements based on evidence unavailable to the 
maker of the overall judgement. It may also turn out 
that there is no other evidence which would produce a 
conflicting ought judgement. Thus an overall reason may 
be a conclusive reason but the maker of the overall judge­
ment will not know whether it is. 'Overall reasons' and 
'overall judgements' are episteraic notions independent 
of the metaphysical notion of 'conclusive reason'.
I shall consider next the ways in which reasons 
combine to form composite reasons,
3.6. Conflicts Between Intrinsic Reasons
I have suggested as analysis of moral conflicts, or 
more generally conflicts between intrinsic reasons, that 
different facts about the situation may yield reasons for 
incompatible actions in that situation. But I left open 
the question of whether such reasons may be weighed against 
each other to produce a strongest reason, and hence a 
favoured course of action in the circumstances. Clearly 
there are cases where this does occur and these are best 
accommodated in terms of a merging of the two reason- 
giving facts to produce a single fact yielding a single 
reason for action. In experiences of such conflict 
situations the weaker obligation may not be completely 
annulled as the agent often feels some regret and tries to 
make up for his unfulfilled obligation. This is not absent 
from the analysis offered since there still exists the 
fact which gave reason for the weaker obligation, so that 
the outweighed reason still counts as a reason. (l shall 
be using 'outweighing* in the same sense as 'overriding'.) 
There are also cases where the two obligations seem equally 
balanced. Here, either it can be claimed that one must out­
weigh the other though it may be beyond the epistemic
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capabilities of the agent to tell which, or it can be 
claimed that a single fact can yield reasons for a 
plurality of incompatible actions.
To accommodate such conflicts on McDowell's second 
view it would be necessary to allow the conception of 
how to live to pick out several salient facts, some of 
which may be stronger than others. To account for the 
overriding of some by others, the conception of how to 
live would have to pick out some facts an overriding and 
others as overriden but not silenced.
3«7* Conflicts between Intrinsic & Non-intrinsic Reasons.
I shall turn now to a discussion of conflicts between 
intrinsic reasons and non-intrinsic reasons. Beginning 
with the problem of forming an overall judgement in the 
conflict situation, McDowell suggests,
part of the point in claiming that the 
requirements of virtue are categorical 
imperatives may lie in a rejection of 
the possibility that the dictates of 
virtue may be outweighed by reasons for 
acting otherwise.
Op. Cit. p.26
But it is clear that the dictates of virtue are sometimes 
outweighed by non-intrinsic reasons. I might have arranged 
an appointment with someone who will have to spend some hour- 
getting to and from the venue, and be totally unable to 
cancel the appointment. I may then view this as giving me 
reason to attend the appointment. This outweighs my slight 
desire not to go because of a toothache. But the situation 
can be adjusted by worsening my toothache up to the point 
where this outweighs my obligation to keep the appointment. 
Again this doesn't annul the reason for keeping the 
appointment. It can still truly be said of me, on this 
view, that I ought to keep the appointment. McDowell's sug­
gestion could then be treated as a terminological point -the
cl a;
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that categorical imperatives imply the existence of only 
those reasons for action that are not overridden. But 
this would require finding a term for those judgements 
implying reasons for action that are overridden, so 
nothing would have been gained. The oddity of such 
a terminological move is clearer when general judgements 
are considered. The judgement ‘people ought to keep their 
promises' is not thought non-categorical due to its some­
times having exceptions. So I shall treat non-intrinsic 
reasons as occasionally, but not usually,overriding intrinsic 
reasons.
A composite judgement is formed in situations in 
which it is judged that there exist both intrinsic and non- 
intrinsic reasons for possible actions, by combining the 
fact that constitutes the intrinsic reason with the 
prospective agent’s desire and fact that the means to satis­
fying that desire are available. (The desire need not be 
for an,action opposed to that for which there is intrinsic 
reason, as could be seen in the horse-racing doctor 
example.) The composite fact will then constitute an 
intrinsic reason, in most cases for the action enjoined 
by the partial intrinsic reason or the partial non-intrinsic 
reason. As in the case of conflicting intrinsic reasons, 
the two reasons may seem equally balanced. To
accommodate this, either it can be regarded that a composite 
fact may yield reasons for a plurality of incompatible 
actions or it could be claimed that the verdict is only 
impossible to find in practice, eind that the apparent need 
to accommodate plurality ceui be satisfied by reference to 
incomplete knowledge for the weighing to be done. One of 
thekreasons will outweigh the other, the outcome arising 
immediately from the compound fact, so that no further 
explanation of why there is reason for the enjoined act is
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necessary beyond the compound fact itself* Whichever 
partial reason loses out will still constitute a reason, 
as in the case of the weaker of two obligations,* I have 
preferred the term 'partial reason' for a reason that may 
form part of a compound reason, to the frequently used 
'prima facie reason' because the latter term has connotations 
of non-genuineness• The compound reason may itself be 
treated as a partial reason if other reason-constituting 
facts exist, known or unknown. Otherwise, the compound 
reason will be a conclusive reason, I shall continue to 
talk simply of reasons, only specifying whether they are 
partial or conclusive when necessary,
3*8. Silencing Versus Outweigliing
On McDowell's second view,\the conception of how to 
live takes into consideration the facts that recommend 
courses of action and singles one of these out as salient. 
Those facts that lose out are silenced and do not count 
as reasons for action at all. Silencing is also preferred 
to outweighing on McDowell's first view as can be seen 
from the following quote ;
If a situation in which virtue imposes 
a requirement is genuinely conceived as 
such, according to this view, then 
considerations which, in the absence of 
the requirement, would have constituted reasons 
for acting otherwise are silenced 
altogether - not overridden by the 
requirement.
op, cit. P.26
Now it is not clear from this passage whether McDowell 
would take the dominant reason as silencing other reasons 
in all conflict situations including those in which virtue 
would impose requirements for conflicting actions (the 
standard moral conflict situation). If so, then he would 
leave himself no room to account for the emotional distress
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that the virtuous person often feels as a result of 
having' to neglect some alternative action that he would 
normally have felt to be required of him. If tb. e 
silencing is only to occur in certain conflict situations, 
then some reason for this inconsistency is owed.
It should also be noted that McDowell talks in this 
passage of a situation in which virtue imposes a require­
ment, not of any situation in which a fact, or conception 
of the circumstances, imposes a requirement. Thus it 
appears that he is excluding considerations of etiquette 
from silencing without yet explaining the essential 
difference between etiquette and virtue. It might appear 
that he is also excluding considerations of self-interest 
^3oth prudential intrinsice reasons and non-intrinsic 
reasons) from silencing, until we read his caveat;
The reasons which silence are those 
which mark out actions as required by 
virtue. There can be less exigent 
moral reasons, and as far as this 
position goes, they may be overridden.
op. cit. P.29
This passage suggests that McDowell believes that overriding 
does occur in some conflict situations, namely those in 
which moral considerations are defeated by other considerations 
But it is uncertain whether these considerations may also be 
moral considerations, or whether some non-moral considerations 
may be overridden. So it is still unclear on McDowell's 
first view, when the silencing comes into operation. More 
important is the question this passage invites as to how it 
is to be judged whether the moral reasons are exigent 
enough to silence others. The exigency of the reason can 
only be determined relative to the other considerations, 
hence a weighing-up must take place prior to the silencing.
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This contrasts with McDowell’s view that silencing 
replaces outweighing;
the dictates of virtue, if properly 
appreciated,are not weighed at all.
Op.Cit.p .26
3.9 , Incontinence
One of the meri.is McDowell claims for silencing 
compared with overriding, is that it provides a better 
account of incontinence. In a situation in which morality 
is thought to require some action and there are competing 
non-moral attractions as well, the continent and incontinent 
man’s inclinations are aroused, as the temperate person's 
are not, by their awareness of competing attractions. The 
temperate man is also aware of the competing attractions 
but they do not engage with his inclinations because his 
conception of the situation, i.e, his belief of a fact that 
constitutes an intrinsic reason for action, silences the 
reasons for action which derive from those attractions.
But now it would appear that the continent and incontinent 
man cannot share the temporate man's conception of the situatioi 
otherwise their inclinations would not engage either. So it 
would appear that the difference in behaviour between the
continent or incontinent man and the temperate man cannot
be explained in terms of a difference in conceptions.
McDowell replies:
The way out is to attenuate the degree 
to which the continent or incontinent
person's conception of a situation matches
that of a virtuous person. Their inclinations 
are aroused, as the virtuous person's are not, 
by their awareness of competing attractions: 
a lively desire clouds or blurs the focus 
of their attention on"the noble" '.
Op. Cit.P.28 
The attenuation McDowell refers to cannot be an 
attenuation of the extent to which other reasons are 
silenced. If a reason is merely muffled then it is not
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silenced and it would have to be said that a conception 
which merely muffles differs essentially from one which 
silences. Hence in having the same conception, the two 
types of agent must believe the same reason - silencing 
fact. TVhere the two types of agent could differ is in 
the extent to which they attend consciouâyto, or actively 
think about, this reason-silencing belief of theirs.
But it cannot be a difference in desires ( a lively desire 
for the continent or incontinent man as opposed to a less 
lively one for the virtuous man) that explains the 
difference in attentiveness to the reason-silencing belief, 
because it is the lack of attention to the reason-silencing 
belief that allows the competing attractions to arouse 
the desires. Hence the silencing model does at least 
accommodate a coherent account of the differences in 
behaviour between the temperate man and the continent or 
incontinent man. The difference is explained neither by 
a difference in beliefs, nor by a difference in desires, 
but by a difference in ability to concentrate on the 
relevant reason-silencing belief. On McDowell's second 
view this would become a difference in ability to concentrate 
on the concern picked out by the conception of how to live.
Once the agent's concentration has lapsed and a desire 
has engaged his attention, all that is left of his categorical 
imperative judgement is the outweighing of the non-intrinsic 
reason by the intrinsic reason. So it appears that though 
the silencing model allows an account of temperate behaviour, 
the account of continent and incontinent behaviour reduces 
to that offered on the outweighing model. An outweighing ' 
model of categorical imperatives will be necessary in any 
case, it has been seen, to account for the way in which an 
outweighed reason may still count as a reason in producing 
certain types of emotion and compensatory action in conflict 
situations.
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The silencing model also seems inadequate for other 
sorts of virtuous behaviour such as courage. Wlien someone 
acts courageously he needs to be aware of the dangers and 
the reasons they provide for choice of action. A person
who doesn't take full consideration of these reasons is
thought foolhardy rather than courageous, A silencing 
of reasons after an initial careful weighing-up will 
seldom be appropriate in explaining courageous action 
either, in view of the uncertainty that often attaches to 
the danger and the need to take constant account of the 
reasons it provides for action during any courageous 
activity that is at all protracted.
Another reason for keeping the outweighing model is
to account for the fact that some people occasionally 
decide to adopt a course of action whilst readily admitting 
that it is morally wrong, and having never intended not to 
follow that course of action. Such cases clearly cannot 
be assimilated to incontinence because no change of 
intention is involved. On such occasions, after incorporating 
his virtue-opposing desire and virtue-promoting fact into 
a composite fact and finding that there still exists an 
intrinsic reason to act virtuously, the agent chooses to act 
in accordance with his partial non-intrinsic reason rather 
than his overall intrinsic reason.
To account for this gap between judging that there 
exists overall intrinsic reason to 0 and intending to 0, some 
way of balancing overall intrinsic reasons and non-intrinsic 
reasons must be found. As the non-intrinsic reason has 
already been integrated into the intrinsic reason, the only 
available option seems to be the balancing of the desire 
consequential upon the possession of the intrinsic reason 
with the desire opposing the intrinsic reason. Such an 
option would only be available on the outweighing model, 
since on the silencing model, the non-intrinsic reason
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would have disappeared and hence would not be available, 
for further balancing. This means that the person's 
ultimate decision as to what to do rests on the strength 
of the consequential desire, in some sense of 'strength' 
which an account along these lines would need to specify.
It follows also, on this account, that when a person does 
decide to do what he thinks there is overall intrinsic 
reason for doing, this w® must also attribute to the 
strength of his consequential desire. Thus all decision­
making on the outweighing model appeaxs to be ultimately 
a balancing of desires.
It is difficult to see how this position can be 
prevented from collapsing into that which dispenses 
altogether with intrinsic reasons. Though there will be 
a difference in judgements between someone using categorical 
imperatives who takes moral reasons as outweighing non-moral 
ones, and someone using only hypothetical imperatives, 
this difference in judgements will have no effect upon the 
decision taken as a result of deliberation, unless it can 
be shown that what determines the strength of the 
consequential desire for the virtuous action differs from 
what determines the strength of a desire in the narrow 
sense for the same action. But it is difficult to imagine 
how this could be so, since the strength of the consequential 
desire cannot be determined by the fact that constituted 
overall intrinsic reason as this would rule out the 
possibility of explaining how the overall intrinsic reason 
sometimes prevails over the opposing desire and sometimes 
loses out.
Having decided that there is overall intrinsic reason 
to 0, the temperate man's behaviour is best explained on 
the silencing model. The same decision made by the 
continent and the incontinent man will sooner or later best
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be explained on the outweighing model, as a result of 
their failure to concentrate on the overall intrinsic 
reason. The temperate man male es a single categorical 
imperative judgement, from which his intention derives.
The continent and the incontinent man make two judgements, 
the categorical imperative judgement from which their 
decision as to what they ought to do derives, and a hypo­
thetical imperative judgement balancing the desire for 
the outweighed option with the purely consequential desire. 
The continent man judges that he still has overall non- 
intrinsic reason to 0, whereas the incontinent man makes 
the opposite judgement. Incontinence is not now restricted 
to failures to act in the course of virtue. A person might 
have decided against the virtuous course of action yet his 
awareness of competing attractions could obtrude * a lively 
sense of obligation clouds or blurs the focus of attention 
on the ignoble.
For McDowell, it seems mysterious how the motivating 
potential of competing attractions can still have energy 
after being outweighed. This must be explained in terms of 
a difference in sense of 'strength of desires* between 
that involved in the forming of the original decision, 
when the desire may only have been acaticipated rather than 
felt, and that involved in the changing of the decision. 
Neither is equivalent to the sense of 'strength* that is 
applied to the force of the phenomenological pull or urge, 
though the latter sense will be closer to it than the former,
On the silencing model, this change of intention might 
be thought not to require explanation in terms of difference 
in sense of'strong desire*. The weighing-up prior to the 
silencing might be regarded as utilising a balance more 
favourable to the virtuous option than that used on the 
outweighing model. But then the incontinent man's overall 
judgement as to what he ought to do would change as he 
moves from the silencing to the outweighing model.
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In conclusion, it has emerged that the formation of 
an overall ought judgement is at the same time the formation 
of an intention if the judgement is a hypothetical imperative, 
or if the judgement is a categorical imperative on the 
silencing model. The silencing model is appropriate for 
only a small section of virtuous behaviour, but a problem 
remained on the outweighing model in characterising the 
different senses of 'strength of desire'.
3.1-0. Variations of Generality.
The variations of generality of categorical imperatives 
can now be discussed in relation to intrinsic reasons. The 
judgements considered thus far have taken the form 'X ought 
to 0' where 'X' denotes a person and '0' is a description 
of an act. It was considered that singular judgements 
could be taken as primary since they are used by those 
who consider them to be derivable from general judgements, 
as well as those who do not; whereas general judgements may 
be seldom used by those, such as McDowell, who do not take
them as providing the foundation for singular judgements. 
Indeed, some might deny that there are any valid general 
judgements.
To this it might be objected that it does not matter 
that exceptions can always arise to any general judgement, 
the important point is that whenever a person makes a
singular judgement he must always be able to pick out some 
general judgement, from which his singular judgement may 
be derived. For according to this view, it would be difficult 
to understand what could be meant by'claiming that there is 
intrinsic reason for X's 0-ing without at the same time 
accepting that there is also reason for anyone in a similar 
position to X's to 0.
But as Winch has pointed out, (in 'The Universalisability 
of Moral Judgements' in Ethics and Action, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1972) it is not obvious that first person ought
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judgements are unintelligible unless they are 
universalisable. In cases where first person moral ought 
judgements conflict, what one person decides he ought to 
do need not be the same as what someone else in a similar 
conflict would decide to do.
A further reason for rejecting the universalisability 
of first person ought judgements is in accounting for the 
phenomenon of superogation. In cases of this, the agent 
invariably judges that he ought to do the act in question 
though he would often refrain from making the corresponding 
third person judgement with regard to people in similar 
situations. It will not be possible to explain this 
apparent failure of universalisability by claiming that 
the agent's judgements are inconsistent - that one (or both) 
of his judgements must be false. The fact that many 
language users would accept this discrepancy between first 
person and third person judgements means that it cannot be 
a logical feature of moral discourse.
If the intrinsic reason for X's 0-ing is specifiable 
not only without essential reference to X's desires, but 
also without essential reference to X, (i.e. it is an 
impersonal reason in Nagel's sense) then the judgements 
'There is reason for X's 0-ing*and 'X ought to 0' will be 
universaltoble. In taking singular judgements as basic 
I ajra accommodating the possibility that not all intrinsic 
reasons are of this impersonal type, and that not all 
particular ought judgements are derivable from general 
judgements. General judgements themselves do not present 
a problem on this approach since truth conditicn s can be 
provided for them in terms of the truth-conditions of. 
particular judgements derivable from them: A general
non-conclusive ought judgement will be true if and only 
if all singular ought judgements derivable from it are
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true. And a general conclusive ought judgement will be _ 
true if and only if most singular ought judgements 
derivable from it are true,
3.11, Etiquette
Having discussed the varieties of forms in which 
categorical and hypothetical imperatives occur, and noting 
that there are both moral and prudential cases of categorical 
imperative, I shall close this chapter with a discussion of 
the possibility of categorical imperatives that are neither 
moral nor prudential.
In ^ Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives',
Foot argues that if categorical imperatives are to be construed 
as those that need not be withdrawn if the prospective action 
cannot be shown to be ancillary to the agent's interests or 
desires, then the imperatives of etiquette and club rules 
are let in on the categorical side. This point is contested 
by D,Z, Phillips,(in "In Search of the Moral 'Must*: Mrs 
Foot’s Fugitive Thought'* Philosophical Quarterly XXVlî, 1977)
In the case of club rules he argues that the imperative 'You 
must obey the rules* is elliptical for 'If you want to join 
the club you must obey the rules,' As the imperative applies 
just as much to members as prospective members this should 
be extended to ’If you want to become or remain a member of 
the club you must obey the rules,' Foot's point is that the 
rules don't fail to apply to a member once he loses interest 
in his membership of the club. The imperative, as it is 
intended, is elliptical for 'If you are a member of the club 
you must obey the rules,' And here the conditional clause 
contains no reference to a desire, so the imperative need not 
be withdrawn if the agent is found to have no desire for 
club membership. Foot, therefore, seems correct in asserting 
that on this construal of the categorical/hypothetical 
imperative distinction, the imperatives of club rules and
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etiquette  ^ as well as morality and prudence are categorical 
imperatives.
However, this led Foot to reject the above definition 
of a categorical imperative as she considered it crucial 
that any rationale for the hypothetical/categorical imperative 
distinction should separate the dictates of etiquette from 
those of morality. Perhaps she inherited Kant's mistake of 
merging the notions of categorical imperative and true 
categorical imperative, thereby not having the option of 
classifying the dictates of etiquette as false. Or 
perhaps she overlooked the distinction between categorical 
imperatives asserting the existence of reasons for action 
and those asserting the existence of conclusive reasons for 
action, thereby losing the option of talcing etiquette as 
providing non-conclusive reasons,
McDowell expresses a similar views
Many actions performed for reasons of 
etiquette can be explained in terms of 
bewitchment by a code. There may be a 
residue of actions not explicable in 
that way. It does not seem to me 
obviously absurd, or destructive of 
the point of emy distinction between 
categorical and hypothetical imperatives, 
to suppose that such residual actions might 
be most revealingly explained in terras of 
non~hypothetically reason-constituting 
conceptions of circumstances. One can 
attribute such conceptions to others 
without being compelled oneself,
op, cit, P.24
It should first be noted that when agents act in 
accordance with rules, principles, or a code, whether or 
not they might be regarded as bewitched, their reasons are 
still of the type thought of as deriving from a conception
1, There are other non-moral, non-prudential categorical
imperatives that could be added to this class, for example 
imperatives based on traditions such as the judgement 
that Owen Wingrave ought to join the army, discussed by 
Williams in 'Internal and External reasons'.
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of the situation irrespective of their desires, McDowell 
doesn't himself believe that the dictates of morality 
can be derived from a few basic rules. (Etiquette, too, 
is not usually thought of by those who take it seriously 
to be a matter of a few rules. The person who gets the 
rules right but lacks the style may be ridiculed,) Never­
theless, this should not prevent him from classifying the 
sincere moral judgements of those who do believe this as
categorical imperatives.
The other feature to note arises from the last 
sentence of this quotation. What can it mean to attribute 
a conception to others, if such a conception is not 
linguistically expressible? McDowell must mean that it is 
possible to entertain precisely that proposition that is 
accepted by someone else as constituting intrinsic reason 
to act, without oneself believing it. But this opens up 
the possibility of a person's entertaining a virtuous 
conception of a situation and yet rejecting it, a possibility 
that McDowell would seem to want to block in the following 
passage:
It would be wrong to infer that the 
conceptions of situations which constitute 
the reasons are available equally to people 
who are not swayed by them, and weigh with 
those who are swayed only contingently upon 
the possession of an independent desire.
That would be to assimilate the second kind 
of reason t> the first. To preserve the 
distinction, we should say that the relevant 
conceptions are not so much as possessed 
except by those whose wills are influenced 
appropriately. Their status as reasons is 
hypothetical only in this truistic sense: 
they sway only those who have them,
op, cit, P.23
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McFetridge shares this interpretation of McDowell 
and sees it as presenting too happy a view of the 
moral outsider:
For it rules out the possibility that 
someone might know how the world is 
talc en to be by those committed to 
morality but simply hold that they were 
mistaken in thinking that things were 
like that. One might think that a 
cognitivist account of morality ought 
not simply to rule out such a possibility,
op, cit, P,40
If, following this interpretation, the gap between 
entertaining a conception and embracing it is closed, it 
must be assumed, for consistency, that two people do not 
have access to the same conception of a situation involving 
etiquette if one sees reason to act in accordance with 
etiquette and the other does not.
But McDowell also writes (last line of p.19)
....one can understand a moral outlook 
without sharing it,
op, cit, P.19
This suggests the alternative view,that a conception could 
be understood,available or entertained without actually 
having, possessing, embracing or believing it. If it is 
believed then it must also be seen as giving reason to act. 
This seems a more faithful interpretation of the beliefs of
the user of categorical imperatives, !
' i '
Thus ' I conclude that there eire uses of categorical 
imperatives in domains such as those of etiquette and club 
rules as well as morality and prudence. Prudential intrinsic 
reasons are readily distinguishable from moral intrinsic 
reasons, as the existence of the former depends on the welfare 
only of the prospective agent whereas the existence of the 
latter depends also on the welfare of others. I shall not
71.
undertake to distinguish other uses of categorical 
imperatives from moral ones. In general they derive 
from matters independent of anyone's welfare. Though a 
case might be made out for assimilating them to moral 
cases. It may cause considerable distress to those who 
live by the conventions of e.g. etiquette, club rules, or 
family tradition when they see these rules being flouted.
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CHAPTER IV. DO ALL, SOME, OR NO PEOPLE USE 
CATEGORICAL OPERATIVES?_______
4.1. A Simple Answer
As a consequence of making the speaker's opinion 
the sole determinant of whether or not he is using a 
categorical imperative, the task of this chapter would 
appear to have been made too simple. In order to argue 
that some, but not all, people make use of categorical 
imperatives in their normal judgement, all I need do is 
produce someone who swears he does use them, and someone 
else who swears he does not. This I can easily do by 
citing myself and a friend of mine. This need not be 
seen as a reductio ad absurdun of the view that there 
is no significant sense in which unconscious beliefs in 
the existence or inexistence of intrinsic reasons can be 
spoken of. The thesis that some but not all people use 
categorical imperatives can be given further support by 
examining the views of philosophers on this question and 
the findings of experimental psychologists. The 
experimental data will also be of relevance in comparing 
the behaviour of those who do use categorical imperatives 
with those who do not. The question is best examined by 
treating the cases of prudence and morality separately.
I shall begin with a brief examination of prudence.
4.2. The Prudential Case
The clearest cases of categorical imperatives are 
those in which Y judges that X ought to ^ , knowing that 
0-ing would not be conducive to the satisfying of any 
of X's present desires in the broad sense (i.e. knowing 
also that X does not even intend to , And the case in 
which I suggested that Y is most likely to have such 
knowledge is the case in which he is making a first 
person past tense judgement. Now it might be thought that 
users of prudential categorical imperatives might easily
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be picked out by asking people whether they ever make 
judgements of the form *I ought to have 0*d, knowing 
that at the time they had no interest that 0ing would 
have promoted; and had no intention of 0ing^as could 
be said of ray judgement 'I ought to have changed sub­
jects at Cambridge years ago'. To this it might be 
objected, however, that such judgements are the mere 
expression of unrealistic wishes and not the assertion 
of the existence of past reasons. This is because any 
such putative reasons would have been unknowable then, 
as future interests could only have been predicted with 
a low degree of certainty. In reply to this, it could 
be pointed out that reasons are thought to exist in 
the present even when people are unaware of them, as^  
was suggested in the example of someone suffering from 
an ailment^for whom there exists reason to take penicillin 
even though the sufferer is unaware that this would cure 
him, A rejoinder to this could be to challenge the view 
that there exists reason when that person could not 
possibly discover the reason. But why should the 
possibility of discovery implying a high degree of 
certainty, be insisted upon? There seems to be no obvious 
reason for this, and hence no reason why past tense first 
person ought-judgements should not be thought of as 
asserting something that entails the existence of past 
reasons. But as complications have arisen, such judge­
ments cannot be taken as providing an acid test for the 
recognition of prudential categorical imperative users.
Perhaps a clearer test case would be the making of 
second person present tense judgements that a person 
ought to do something for the sake of his future welfare 
which would not further any of his present interests^ and 
which he has no intention of doing. A possible example 
of this would be 'You ought to take a cold shower every 
morning'. By considering examples of this kind it should
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be easy for people to recognise when they do use 
categorical imperatives in prudential judgements; 
and after an extensive consideration of examples, those 
that do not find any such judgements that they would 
recognise as making themselves, ought to become convinced 
that all their prudential judgements are hypothetical 
imperatives.
It is difficult to decide whether all, some, or no 
people use categorical imperatives in making prudential 
judgements because of the problem of deciding whether desires 
for future welfare or happiness are to be accepted as 
legitimate, i.e. non-vacuous. If hypothetical imperatives 
based on such desires are ruled out, then it would seem as 
though categorical imperatives are a universal feature of 
prudential judgement. Otherwise, it would be difficult to 
explain how someone could regard their former conception 
of their own happiness to have been warped, or someone 
else's conception of his own happiness to be warped.
4 .3. The Views of Some Modern Philosophers.
Mackie offers an account of what he calls moral 
scepticism that appears to match what I have in mind by 
amoralism. The task at hand is to find a precise des­
cription of what the sceptic is sceptical of. Mackie provides 
an over-simple account of this by calling the issue an 
ontological one: The moral objectivist believes in the
existence of a special kind of entity glossed as objective 
value and indluding moral values and intrinsic reasons for 
action. The moral sceptic does not. There is an equally 
simple way of choosing between these two positions: if these 
entities do exist then moral objectivism is correct and 
moral scepticism must be rejected. Mackie himself argues 
that the moral sceptics have got things right, and introduces 
the term 'error theory* for his view that many moral judge­
ments entail the false proposition that there exist objective
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values and hence intrinsic reasons. I shall not beg 
the question in favour of moral scepticism by adopting 
the term 'error theory* but note this as an example of 
a view that moral judgement is bifurcated within a 
speech community, and in which the objectivist and 
hence the categorical imperative users are in the 
majority.
Williams too can be seen as adhering to an error 
theory in Mackie*s sense, when he suggests that
external reasons statements, when 
definitely isolated as such, are false 
or incoherent, or really something else 
misleadingly expressed.
op. cit. P.26
The tenor of the paragraph suggests that he*d rather not 
think of such judgements as false, but as misleadingly 
expressing some sort of evaluative judgement. I can't 
help feeling that Williams is rductantly drifting towards 
a more subjectivist position. In denying the connection 
between ought-judgements and reason statements he avoids 
committing himself to saying that all categorical imperative 
statements are based upon false belief, yet his arguments 
have bought him virtually to this position.
McDowell talks of the outside gaining entry to the 
moral outlook by having certain natural desires that lead 
him to act similarly to the moral man. This outsider is 
clearly someone whose judgements are all hypothetical 
imperatives. Yet it is not clear to me whether McDowell's 
outsider is a theoretical construct, or whether he believes^ 
such outsiders are actual members of society. So it is not 
obvious whether McDowell would consider all or some people 
to use categorical imperatives in their moral discourse.
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For Foot's view I return to what she describes as 
the central supposition
that moral considerations necessarily 
give reasons for acting to any man.
As noted, two possible interpretations of the notion of 
categorical imperative may be drawn from this. Either it 
is to be taken that a categorical imperative is a statement 
that itself gives reason for acting, and Foot herself agrees 
that it is implausible that all should statements give 
reasons for acting, or it is to be taken that a categorical 
imperative is a statement expressing the existence of 
reasons for acting. Foot comments on the supposition above,
the difficulty is, of course, to defend, 
this proposition which is more often 
repeated than explained.
op. cit. p .309
Her conviction that the proposition cannot be defended 
leads her to conclude that there are no categorical 
imperatives. This would be an acceptable conclusion on 
the first of the two interpretations of her notion of 
categorical imperative mentioned above. However, on the 
more plausible interpretation argued for in the previous 
chapter, her view that moral considerations do not necessarily 
give reasons for acting to any man, leads naturally to the 
conclusion that categorical imperatives are false judgements.
Foot does recognise a distinction between judgements 
which may be regarded as hypothetical imperatives and state­
ments which purport to express categorical imperatives.
Someone adopting this position of Foot's will, she writes,
recognise in the statement that one ought 
to care about these things (liberty, 
justice etc.) a correct application of 
the non-hypothetical moral "ought" (nHU) 
by which society is apt to voice its 
demands.
op. cit. p .315
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But these NHUs Foot treats non-cognitively:
Suppose that what we take for a puzzling 
thought were really no thought at all 
but only the reflection of our feelings 
about morality?
I claim that Foot's treatment of NHUs is non-cognitive 
because she attributes to them an emotive meeining whilst 
regarding them as having no truth-value. She differs 
from non-cognitivists in general in that she would cert­
ainly wish to provide a cognitivist analysis of hypothetical 
imperatives in contrast to most prescriptivists and 
emotivists who tend to treat categorical and hypothetical 
imperatives together and regard them as essentially non­
information-providing. Foot also differs from emotivists 
in regarding such non-cognitive utterances as serving no 
useful function, whereas most emotivists regard these 
utterances in virtue of their capacity to express and 
engender moral feelings, as constituting the essence of 
moral discourse.
According to Foot's eraotivist sketch of the NHU, we 
feel a binding force in association with moral judgements 
which derives from the strictness of our moral education.
She claims that one can feel as if one has to do what is 
morally required without believing oneself to be under 
physical or psychological compulsion. Her failure to find 
any alternative form of compulsion then led her to reject 
belief in compulsion as a basis for moral judgement. Foot 
compares moral feelings to the feeling of falling, which 
she correctly claims can be experienced without actually 
believing oneself to be falling. By this analogy, it looks 
as though she is suggesting that people can feel compelled 
without actually believing themselves to be. But those who 
could sincerely claim to .believe themselves to be compelled, 
and I take them to be the majority, must,according to the 
argument of 29 be accredited with that belief.
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Another difficulty facing an analysis of moral 
judgements that dispenses with moral beliefs.arises in 
accounting for the differences in a person’s feelings 
that accompany what that person thinks is a change in 
his beliefs. Feelings of compulsion may rapidly drop 
away once a person no longer thinks he believes himself 
to be compelled ( e.g. by the standards of etiquette). 
Residual feelings may often remain after a person thinks 
he has abandoned a belief, but it is difficult to explain 
what may sometimes be a dramatic change in feelings with­
out reference to a change in beliefs. Feelings may also 
strengthen or even originate in adulthood long after the 
principle psychological factors involved in inculcating 
feelings have had their effect.
Thus I think Foot is mistaken in supposing that certain 
judgements that purport to be expressions of moral beliefs 
are in fact merely the expressions of feelings. In 
asserting that moral judgements are hypothetical imperatives, 
Foot often appears to hold that all moral judgements taking 
the standard linguistic forms for practical judgements are 
hypothetical imperatives. I have suggested that she is 
more plausibly interpreted as claiming that certain utter­
ances involving the NHU which might normally be construed 
as categorical imperatives, are not proper judgements at all, 
and that all authentic moral judgements are hypothetical 
imperatives.
It is difficult to say with any certainty what answers 
should be attributed to existentialist writers on this 
question. It is likely that they would regard those 
involved in inauthentic existence as using categorical 
imperatives, but in building an authentic existence if often 
appears as though intrinsic reasons reappear for 
actions having such characteristics as honesty, courage, 
and faithfulness to one's chosen set of principles. If an 
initial act of commitment is taken as providing reasons for
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action, then it is most plausibly that act itself which 
should be regarded as the reason, as in the case of a promise, 
rather than any antecedent interest that that act of commit­
ment might have been founded upon. On such a view, reasons 
are independent of desires and hence intrinsic. On the 
other hand the act of commitment might be thought of as 
initiating an interest which might cease at any time in 
the future, in whichcase reasons for actions would be 
regarded as non-intrinsic.
Thinkers based in Taoist and Hinayana Buddhist 
traditions should be regarded as non—users of categorical 
imperatives and hence will be likely to regard some but 
not all people as non-users of categorical imperatives.
An example of a modern philosopher influenced by oriental 
thought who can be regarded as a non-categorical imperative 
user is Raymond Smullyan, as may be seen in his book 'The 
Tao is Silent', Harper Row, 1977* (see especially p.70,
Taoism Versus Morality).
4.4. Kohlberg's Experimental Enquiry
At the beginning of this chapter, I expressed the hope 
that empirical investigation might throw light on the 
question of the extent of the use of categorical imperatives 
in moral judgement. The best known psychological work on 
moral judgement is that of Piaget and Kohlberg. Piaget's 
work concentrated mainly on the moral judgement of young 
children, whereas that of Kohlberg extends across all age 
groups, social classes, and a variety of cultural groups.
Kohlberg's central concern is to show that age develop­
ment in moral judgement parallels development of non - 
moral cognitive faculties, and that it proceeds through 
an invariant sequence of six stages, each of which 
integrates and replaces, rather than adds to, the 
preceding stage. Kohlberg's data is based on a system 
for scoring any moral judgement in any context, but he 
uses it primarily in analysing responses to ten hypothetical 
moral dilemmas that were presented to the subjects.
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Unfortunately, none of the six stages can be 
taken as one in which the categorical imperative is 
not used at all. Stages four, five and six involve 
explicit recourse to the concept of duty, rules and 
principles and hence contain only responses in the 
categorical imperative mode. Stage one is based on 
obedience and punishment. Stage tiv^o is summarised as 
follows :
Naively egoistic orientation. Right 
action is that instrurnentally satis­
fying the self's needs and occasionally 
others. Awareness of relativism of 
value to each actor's needs and 
perspective. Naive egalitarianism and 
orientation to exchange and reciprocity.
'The Cognitive-Developmental Approach 
to Socialisation' in Goslin (ed.) 
Handbook of Socialisation, Theory & 
Research, Rand McNally, I969.
Stage 3 is summarised:
Good-boy orientation. Orientation to 
approval and to pleasing and helping 
others - Conformity to stereo-typical 
images of majority or natural role 
behaviour, and judgement by intentions.
Stages tw3 and three, therefore, seem the likeliest 
groups into which a moral judgement using the hypothetical 
imperative could fall. However, it is probable that judge­
ments viewed as exhibiting 'naive egalitarianism' in stage 
two, and 'judgement by intentions' in stage three would be 
categorical imperatives. Tliis mixture of hypothetical and 
categorical imperative judgements in these stages is 
apparent from the example offered of one of the moral 
dilemmas with a positive and negative 'standardised' response 
(invented by Kohlberg) appropriate to each stage.
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'In Europe, a woman was near death from 
cancer. One drug might save her, a form 
of radium that a dmiggist in the same town 
had recently discovered. The druggist was 
charging ^2,000, ten times what the drug 
cost him to make. The sick wiman's hus­
band, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to 
borrow the money, but he could only get 
together about half of what it cost. He 
told the druggist that his wife was dying 
and asked him to sell it cheaper or let 
him pay later. But the druggist said. "No" 
The husband got desperate and broke into 
the man's store to steal the drug for his 
wife. Should the husband have done that? 
Wliy?
Op. Cit. p.379
It is clear from the way that the question is phrased 
that a categorical imperative answer is being invited.
There is no alternative means available for the man to 
satisfy his desire to save his wife, as the story is 
presented, so the hypothetical imperative answer is 
obvious. Nevertheless, if a non-categorical imperative user 
were to be presented with such a question, he would give the 
obvious affirmative answer, basing his reasons on Heinz's 
love for his wife, and the action taken being his only hope
of saving her. Two of the standardised stage 2 responses
given are:
'It's all right to steal the drug because 
she needs it and he wants her to live. It
isn't that he wants to steal, but it's
the way he has to use to get the drug to 
save her*
Op. Cit. p.379
'If you do happen to get caught you could 
give the drug back and you wouldn't get 
much of a jail sentence. It wouldn't 
bother you much to serve a little jail 
term if you have your wife when you get 
out. *
Op. Cit. p.381
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Again, the way the first of these standardised 
answers is phrased by way of the 'It's all right' renders 
it unquestionably a categorical imperative, though if 
this were replaced by something like 'He should', this 
and the second response could be either hypothetical 
or categorical imperatives. As'Kohlberg also supplies 
negative standardised responses to the question at all 
stages, including two and three, it is clear that he 
assumes that there will be categorical imperative answers.
Responses to moral dilemmas of this sort could be 
used in investigating empirically the extent to which moral 
judgements are made with hypothetical imperatives. It 
would be important to include cases in which verdicts 
were likely to differ in accordance with choice of hypo­
thetical and categorical imperative, as well as cases in 
which the hypothetical imperative judgement required 
careful means/end reasoning so that it would be clear when 
an Einswer neglected non-hypothetical considerations.
The cross-cultural survey showed a preference for 
stage three and four judgements by the age of sixteen in 
middle class urban boys in Taiwan and Mexico, and for 
stage 1, 2 and 3 judgements in isolated village boys at 
that age in Turkey and Yucatan. Unfortunately, the 
published results indicate for each population only the 
percentage of judgements at each stage, so that if the 
entire population used both stage 3 8-nd stage 4 judgements 
with equal frequency, this would appear the same as the 
case in which half the population uses only stage 3 judge­
ments, and the other half only stage 4, Thus it is 
impossible to tell from Kohlberg's presentation of his 
data, what percentage of the populations use only stage two 
or stage three judgements, which would give some indication 
of exclusive use of hypothetical imperatives. Even so, the 
high percentage of stage 2 and stage 3 responses in some 
populations could be taken as slight evidence for the 
viability of a morality based on hypothetical imperatives, 
and its commonness in certain cultures. It could be 
expected especially in oriental cultures, such as those
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influenced by Hinayana Buddhism, though unfortunately, 
none of these feature in Kohlberg's experiments,
Kohlberg does present some information about 
individuals whose responses fall with regularity into 
only one or two stages. But these examples are picked 
out as exceptions. He analyses some statements made by 
Adolf Eichraann, showing that they fall predominantly into 
stages 1 and 2, and he also talks of*the con-man morality 
as a crystallisation at stage 2. However, these examples 
need not be taken as indicating that all characters whose 
judgements would predominantly be classified as stage 2 
need have hatreds for large sections of humanity, or no 
concern for other people. The only case recorded of a 
'regression' to a lower stage was found amongst twenty 
percent of middle-class boys at the end of high school to 
mid-college, but they were all found to have returned at 
least to their previous stage by their late twenties.
Though Kohlberg argues that development is, with this 
one exception, from lower to higher of his six stages, it 
seems likely that someone growing up in a culture in which 
categorical imperative moral judgements are prevalent 
would first adopt such a form of judgonent before rejecting 
it. Though Kohlberg's investigations show no sign of 
permanent shifts to a lower stage, his analyses were directed 
at different issues, and so need not be taken as counting 
against the view that some members of certain cultures use 
only hypothetical imperatives.
Against the view that there could be cultures in which 
categorical imperatives are scarce or non-existent, it 
might be argued that children must pass through the stage 
one morality based on authority and obedience, and hence 
will first come into contact with words like "should" in 
connection with the demands of authority, usually the 
parents, to perform actions that are clearly at variance 
with the desires they recognise as their own. Yet unless 
the child can distinguish between 'You should' and
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'I want you to* it cannot be said of him yet that he 
understands and makes judgements that are categorical 
imperatives. Thus it has not been shown that no 
society could flourish with a system of moral education 
that dispensed with categorical imperatives. On the 
other hand, no positive evidence has been found that 
there exists or has existed such a society.
In summary, I hope I have shown that empirical 
evidence could establish the frequency within a community^ 
of persons using only hypothetical imperatives in making 
their moral judgements; or the existence of a community 
in which categorical imperatives are not used at all. 
Modern philosophical scepticism about categorical 
imperatives suggests that a morality without them is a 
genuine practical possibility. In the following chapter 
I shall discuss the differences between a morality based 
on hypothetical imperatives and one based on categorical 
imperatives, and some arguments concerned with the 
justification of categorical imperatives.
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CHAPTER V. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN USE AND NON-USE 
OF CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES
5.1• Plan of Chapter
An attempt will now be made to look at the differences 
in behaviour between those who use categorical imperatives 
and those who do not. The differences in behaviour will be 
differences in language use, action, and emotion.
In the introduction the thought was raised that the 
difference between moralist and amoralist, which I equated 
with a difference between the user and non-user of categori­
cal imperatives, might turn out to be merely a difference 
in language use. It has emerged that the difference will 
not be easy to spot since both moralist and amoralist make 
use of judgements with and without conditional clauses.
What determines whether a practical judgement is a hypothetical 
or a categorical imperative is a secondary judgement that the 
person making the judgement could make if requested. There 
are thus not two distinct linguistic forms concerning which 
the question of the existence of simple translation males 
from one into the other could be raised. Accepting that 
there are sometimes practical difficulties in distinguishing 
categorical from hypothetical imperatives, the differences 
in language use are at least easy to chart: In situations 
in which someone uses a categorical imperative, the non-user 
will either refrain from making a practical judgement 
altog&her, or he will make the linguistically equivalent 
hypothetical judgement, or he will make an alternative 
hypothetical judgement.
The approach this suggests that will be adopted is to 
look at the situations in which a person may make a 
categorical imperative judgement, dividing these up accord­
ing as the judgement is made in the first, second or third 
person, present or past tense, and then examine the linguistic 
alternatives and consequent differences in action and emotion 
for the non-user. As there will be some cases in which a non-
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believer in intrinsic reasons will nonetheless use a 
categorical imperative, though not believing that it can 
be supported by an intrinsic reason, I shall not use the 
terms 'user' and 'non-user of categorical imperatives'.
And in view of the similar clumsiness of the terms 'believer' 
and 'non-believer of intrinsic reasons' I shall revert to 
using the terras 'moralist' and 'amoralist', apart from in 
the short section on prudential judgements. These terms 
should be understood in the sense indicated in Chapter I.
The amoralist need not be an egoist as will emerge in the 
following paragraphs.
It may be thought that many of the moral decisions 
facing the moralist jus.t would not arise for an amoralist. 
However, this need not be the case. An amoralist may have 
a great stock of interests which would be considered moral 
by the moralist, and a moralist may be insensitive and 
largely oblivious of the moral considerations that moralists 
usually see as providing intrinsic reasons for action.
Camus' Outsider provides an example of this. He shows us 
that he accepts the institution of categorical imperative — 
making and occasionally acts upon it, as exemplified in his 
visiting his mother although he regarded it as *a fag/
Another example in which he uses a categorical imperative 
is his wondering whether he ought to smoke whilst sitting 
beside his mother's coffin. But he is largely unaware of 
the desires and feelings of others and neither sees these 
as intrinsic reasons nor incorporates them into his own 
projects.
A person making first person moral practical judgements 
by means of hypothetical imperatives will do so, according 
to Foot, only in so far as he accepts certain moral ends 
such as justice and liberty. And his second and third 
person judgements will be conditional upon the acceptance 
in the prospective agent of certain moral ends. The range
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of such hypothetical imperative judgements can be extended 
to include judgements conditional upon the desire that the 
agent's actions have a certain moral character. To 
illustrate this extension, the judgement that a person 
should tell the truth on some particular occasions may be 
construed hypothetically either as conditional upon that 
person's desire to create some of the benefits that honest 
dealings bring to men, or as conditional upon that person's 
desire to act honestly. >/hat is meant here by having a 
moral end such as justice or honesty is desiring that 
people reap the rewards of just or honest actions. In the 
occasional case in which the just act or the honest act 
would be expected to bring less benefit overall, when a 
person judges hypothetically that he ought to perform such 
an act, it would not be said of him that he accepts justice 
and honesty as ends. It could, however, be said of him 
that he desires that his actions possess the virtue of 
justice or honesty.
At this point it might appear as though the moralist 
and amoralist could sometimes be indistinguishable. There 
will be a difference though in the way the virtue is grounded 
The moralist will have cultivated the virtue through 
disciplining himself to perform virtuous acts because of a 
belief about the world, though the early stages of this 
cultivation would have been controlled by others especially 
his parents. The amoralist will generally have come to 
possess the virtue through a drifting of his preferences.
The person who develops virtuous dispositions like the raorali 
and later comes to reject his belief in intrinsic reasons 
whilst retaining his preference for virtuous action must be 
designated an amoralist though admittedly his actions may 
match those of the moralist completely. Differences between 
these two types of virtuous agent may still be expected howev 
in judgement of the actions of others, and in the experiencin 
of emotion. Though an amoralist may act in the same way that 
a conventionally virtuous man would act, it is to be 
stressed that such a resemblance would be exceptional.
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Foot recently gave as a non-moral example of a 
judgement she would have regarded as categorical, 'I 
ought to pick these things up from the floor because they 
don't belong on the floor'. As a result of her domestic 
training she had come to believe in the existence of an 
intrinsic reason for tidiness and keeping everything in 
''its place. After abandoning that belief she still retained 
a preference for tidy floors, but her reason for picking 
things up from the floor should now be regarded as non- 
intrinsic.
5.2. First Person Moral Judgements.
Looking now at moral first person past tense judge-
i , )
ments^I ought to have P'd, four cases can be distinguished 
depending on whether the agent did or did not 0, and on 
whether his judgement prior to the time at which the act 
was to be performed was that he ought to 0, or that he 
ought not to 0.
In the case in which X did 0, and his judgement prior 
to acting had been that he ought to 0, it is unlikely that 
there will be any systematic difference in the tendency a 
person has to making such judgements corresponding to a 
difference between use and non-use of categorical imperatives. 
The feelings accompanying the making of a categorical 
imperative of this type are often described as self-righteous 
and contrasted with those attending the corresponding hypo­
thetical imperative judgement. In describing the emotional 
difference between the moralist eind the amoralist in such 
circumstances as a difference between self-righteousness and 
self-congratulation, I have merely indicated the change in 
cognitive component. Unfortunately, there are no terms 
available in ordinary language with which to isolate the 
cognitive from the affective - a fact which reflects our 
epistemological difficulties in making the distinction rather 
than a lack of interest in such a distinction.
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To give a fuller account of the emotional differences, a 
comparison of bodily sensation;would be necessary. This 
could be attempted by way of a statistical comparison of 
such physiological gauges of emotion as heartbeat, 
respiration, brain rhythms, galvanic skin response etc.
(These remarks apply throughout this chapter to 
redescriptions of such emotions as guilt, indignation and 
resentment in which nothing more than the change in cognitive 
element can be expressed.)
The second and third cases in which a judgement of 
the form 'X ought to have 0'd’ is made are those in 
which X acted incontinently. In one of these, 'X's 
present judgement agrees with that which he made prior to 
his acting incontinently. In the other, his judgement 
differs and he is looking back on his incontinence as a 
piece of good frtune. In the fourth case, X's present 
judgement is different from the past judgement which he 
acted upon.' This may have been due to his changing his 
mind just before acting, or to his having made the wrong 
decision altogether.
Beginning with incontinence, it is interesting to 
note that not everyone would claim to act in a way that 
meets what is often termed a pretheoretical description 
of the phenomenon. Wiggins for example writes:
Almost anyone not under the unfluence of 
theory will say that, when a person is 
weak-willed, he intentionally chooses 
that which he knows or believes to be 
the worse course of action when he could 
choose the better course.
(Weakness of Will, Coramensurability, 
and the Objects of Deliberation and 
Desire in P.A.S. 1979, P.l.)
In a recent seminar in which Wiggins was discussing . this 
topic, there was a signifieantirruption of objections, not 
to his ensuing analysis, but to the idea that the given
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description of weak will was of general applicability.
About half those present felt that in situations of weal{ 
will they would consider themselves for a time at least 
to have changed their mind as to what was best, as well 
as their intention. Still I shall preserve the pre- 
theoretical description by restricting the terms 'incontinence* 
and 'weakness of will' to cases where the agent changes his 
intention but not his judgement as to what was best.
A puzzle over incontinence can now be seen to parallel 
closely the problem of Chapter IV concerning categorical 
imperatives. Does the pre-theoretical description of 
incontinence fit behaviour in which all people, some pelple, 
or no people engage? As with the corresponding problem as 
to whether all people, some people, or no people use 
categorical imperatives, the option of 'some people' has not 
been popular amongst theorists. As with the categorical 
imperative case, the question is simply answered in favour of 
this option if the agent's own testimony as to whether his 
behaviour ever fits the description of incontinence is taken 
as sufficient. And similarly there are great problems in 
finding a set of criteria under which such testimony can 
be overruled.
In fact it turns out that the division between people 
that sometimes intentionally act contrary to their best 
judgement and those that never do, can be shown to be 
related to the division between those believing in the 
existence of intrinsic reasons and thosewho do not. I have 
claimed that a person making an overall hypothetical 
imperative judgement that he ought to 0 will of necessity 
intend to 0, since the judgement is his balancing of his 
present desires. This would suggest that his actions could 
not possibly satisfy the pretheoretical description of 
incontinence, and hence that he would be someone who would
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claim to have changed his mind, i.e. his judgement as 
to what was best, at the last moment. Thus the amoralist 
cannot act in accordance with the pretheoretical 
description of incontinence.
Iviien a person judges overall categorically that he 
ought to 0 this judgement may automatically constitute 
an intention to 0 or it may not. I have suggested that 
the silencing model best accommodates an explanation of 
the behaviour of the man for whom the overall categorical 
imperative judgement automatically constitutes an intention 
to 0. He will be a possessor' of the virtue of temperance, 
prone neither to incontinence nor to changing lois judgement 
at the last moment. The behaviour of the continent and 
the incontinent man is best explained on the outifeighing 
model, in which it is posssible for the agent's categorical 
imperative judgement as to what is best, to diverge from 
his hypothetical imperative judgement from which his intention 
derives. It is the agent's hypothetical imperative judge­
ment that changes at the point of incontinence and this need 
not be accompanied by a change in his categorical imperative 
judgement. Thus the moralist may sometimes act in accor­
dance with the pretheoretical description of incontinence, 
and may sometimes change his mind at the last moment as to 
what is the best course of action.
I shall now make some suggestions as to the effect upon 
action and emotion that such a difference in conceptualising 
may have.
The moralist will sometimes act incontinently..- and feel 
some guilt or shame at having failed to do what he judged 
was best. Such emotion will be stronger than that following 
his decision to change his judgement which may be a sort of 
shame that his desires were so strong as to outweigh other 
considerations that would have led to a different action.
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The m8d.li difference between the moralist who changes his_ 
judgement as to what is best and the amoralist who never 
acts incontinently is that the former person is likelier 
to change his mind again after acting. The latter person 
can only change his judgement afterwards if he thinks that 
better means were available to furthering the interests 
that he had at the time of acting. If he sees no such 
mistake he may still feel some sadness, shame or embarrassment 
at the desires or interests that were his at the time.
Immediately prior to acting, the moralist is less 
likely to change his judgement as to what is best, but more 
likely to change his intention, i.e. to act incontinently.
This is because the amoralist will always be balancing 
interests and desires that are his own, and these are 
likely to be more stable than the moralist's desire which is 
consequential upon belief in the existence of an intrinsic 
reason that enters his intention-forming judgement.
I shall now discuss the case of past tense judgements 
in which a person does not perform the act he judges he 
ought to have, through having failed to reach the right 
decision. The only retrospective reaction likely from the 
amoralist is shame or annoyance at his own inability to
calculate or forsee consequences, with perhaps a noting of
the experience as a guide to future judgement. The moralist 
on the other hand is judging that something should have 
been done which would not have been conducive to the 
satisfying of any of his desires at that time. In many
situations of this type, the amoralist would not make a
!
judgement at all. The situations in which he makes a judge­
ment that he ought to have 0'd when he did not, are
invariably situations in which the moralist would also make 
a judgement, either the corresponding categorical imperative 
or another hypothetical imperative. Thus the moralist will 
more frequently find himself feeling displeasure over a
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poor judgement made in the past than a amoralist.
Considering together the four cases of past tense 
judgements ’I ought to have 0'd*, the moralist is likely, 
in his behaviour towards others, to be more sensitive 
to his own past success in acting in accordance with his 
present judgement, than the amoralist. He will, for
example, tend to accept the reproofs of others and feel
less able to condemn others when he considers them to be 
behaving wrongly, if he himself frequently fails to act 
in accordance with what he judges to be best. The amoralist 
will have a different manner of dealing with criticism and 
influencing the actions of others. His success in influencin 
action may well depend on his own past record of action, but 
his efforts and keenness to do so will not. Whether or not 
the agent is a moralist should not affect his expectation of 
response from others, as it will be the conceptualising 
of his audience that will be relevant to the response. The 
moralist might be more likely to modify his own future 
conduct as a result of his retrospective judgement of his 
own actions on account of the greater number of cases in 
which he can make a present judgement that he ought to have
0'd when in fact he did not 0.
Concerning first person present tense judgements, there 
will be two types of decision that the moralist makes that 
are qualitatively different from those made by the amoralist. 
These will be the conflicts between two intrinsic reasons 
for incompatible actions, and the conflicts between intrinsic 
and non-intrinsic reasons. In the moral conflict situation, 
the person who conceptualises in terras of hypothetical 
imperatives will not feel guilty or blameworthiness over his 
leaving one of the acts unperformed. He may, however, feel 
horrified at the unfortunate circumstances that forced the 
decision on him, and feel compassion for the victims, though 
this would be no different from the compassion he might feel 
for the victims if the injury had been inflicted by someone 
else. As well as being qualitatively different, the emotion 
experienced by acting by the moralist is likely to be 
stronger than that of the amoralist. Whilst deliberating
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and prior to acting, the emotional state of the agent 
is unlikely to depend on the way he conceptualises the 
decision. The thought of leaving either of the actions 
unperformed may be just as unpleasant, and the decision 
just as excruciating,for the person who formulates the 
judgement as a hypothetical imperative.
I have discussed the differences between the moralist's 
experience of conflicts between intrinsic and non-intrinsic 
reasons and the experience of an amoralist who encounters 
a similar situation in connection with past tense judgements. 
An interesting particular case of such conflicting reasons 
which has not been discussed is that of supererogation.
Acts of supererogation are those regarded as not 
required by duty, yet of supreme moral worth. There are 
two main types into which such acts fall. One type consists 
of acts that would be considered as both of value, and 
required by duty, were it not for some considerable incon­
venience or danger to the prospective agent in the situation. 
The moral value attaching to the action is considered to be 
greatly enhanced as a result of inconvenience or danger, and 
in situations in which there is danger, the act would be 
regarded as possessing to a high degree the virtue of 
courage. The other type of supererogatory act consists of 
acts in which no special inconvenience or danger is present, 
such as may be found in some examples of running a non- 
profit-making organisation or accepting a position of 
leadership.
The principal difficulties facing an analysis of super­
erogation are in explaining the divide between evaluation 
and reason-giving, and in explaining the enhancing of the 
value attaching to an action by the presence of danger. 
Beginning by considering the supererogatory act motivated 
by a categorical imperative user, it will not be too difficult 
to see how the agent came to judge that there was overall
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intrinsic reason for him to act, commensurate with the 
favourable light in which he saw the act. What will be more 
difficult to comprehend is how others would regard the act 
as highly praiseworthy, yet not make the third person 
judgement that there was intrinsic reason for the agent to 
have acted the way he did. The same problem arises in 
accounting for the making of a first person practical 
judgement that there is no overall intrinsic reason to act 
courageously together with an evaluative judgement that the 
courageous act would be better than the non-courageous one, 
in situations in which the person raalcing the judgement 
decides not to adopt the courageous choice of action.
Perhaps the failure of entailment from the evaluative 
statement to the overall reason statement can remain as an 
unexplained feature of an ordinary moral judgement. More 
problematic is the apparent compatibility of 'There exists 
overall intrinsic reason for X's 0-ing' with 'There does 
not exist overall intrinsic reason for X's 0-ing* when the 
first judgement is made by X, and the second by someone else. 
One of these judgements would have to be considered false 
if 'intrinsic reason' is to remain an objective notion. The 
most acceptable of these options would be to claim that the 
saint or hero's judgement that he had overall intrinsic 
reason to act was false. This need not detract from the 
high moral worth with which the action is regarded.
Sometimes, however, the agent will see the supererogative 
act as not required of him, just as it would not be 
required of anyone else. If he then decided to go ahead with 
such action, this must be explained in terras of an interest 
(e.g. in some charity or form of social work, or,in the case 
of courageous action,in the welfare of an individual or group 
of individuals), in which case his judgement will be a
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hypothetical imperative* Such a hypothetical imperative 
judgement to do the supererogatory act may be made by 
someone who normally uses categorical imperatives in his 
moral judgment, i.e. the moralist,as well as by the 
amoralist. Thus supererogatory acts are not restricted 
to moralists, and it will often be easier to understand 
the decision prior to acting as a hypothetical imperative.
5« 3* Second Person Moral Judgements.
Turning to moral judgements given in the second person, 
a moralist may be advising in the genuine belief that the 
prospective agent may take the advice, and that there is 
overall intrinsic reason for him to perform the recommended 
act. Or he may be stating a belief in the past tense that 
cannot be utilised in any future actions, but that is 
nevertheless felt to be worth pointing out for the benefit 
of the might-have-been agent. People have an interest in 
the past that is not totally dependent on their interest 
in the future. Then there is the hackle-raising use,where 
the judgement is offered not in any belief that the advice 
will be adopted, but as an expression of indignation intended 
merely to outrage the recipient. Finally, there is the use 
in which a person, Y, aims to guide another, X, purely for 
his, Y ’s, own ends. Mackie claims that the speaker's 
attitude can help constitute the reason for the proposed 
action, and he labels this type of reason egocentric, in 
contrast with intrinsic and hypothetically imperative 
reasons (op. cit. P.23). As 1 have defined intrinsic and 
non intrinsic reasons, they are exhaustive, and parallel 
Mackie's intrinsic and hypothetically imperative reasons.
It is true that when Y asserts to X, 'You ought to 0', Y's 
attitudes, principles and interests may be partly 
accessible to X and may contribute to the existence of a 
reason for X's 0—ing. But they would contribute by means
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of an intrinsic reason deriving from Y's authoritative 
position over X, or from X's desire to conform to Y's 
demands based on his liking of Y or his fear of him.
Thus if reasons deriving from a speaker's attitude 
play any part in validating 'You ought to 0*, they do so 
as intrinsic or non-intrinsic reasons. The term 'egocentric 
reasons' may be adopted so long as it is realised that 
these do not constitute a third category of reason.
Of the uses just sketched that are available to the 
moralist, those connected with advice are invariably 
cast in categorical imperative form. This is because the 
believer in intrinsic reasons will see the aspect of some 
moral consideration that is conducive to the satisfying 
of the agent's own desires as irrelevant, except as bait 
where necessary to lure the agent into doing the right 
thing. The amoralist will always address his advice to 
some moral interest of the prospective agent's and hence 
the scope of his advice will be restricted in comparison 
with that available to the moralist. This advice will on 
average have a greater chance of being heeded than that of 
the moralist, since it addresses the interests of the 
prospective agent.
The purely informative non-advisory past tense 
imperative will be unavailable to the amoralist as it 
indicates something the moralist takes to be a fact worth 
pointing out which is of interest irrespective of one's 
interest in the future. To the stnoralist there are no such 
facts. The antagonistic or hackle-raising use in both 
present and past tense relies for its effect on a belief 
that the statement could be true. Thus the amoralist may 
use a categorical imperative knowing it to be invalid, 
purely because of the effect he expects it to have on its 
recipient, if the recipient is himself a moralist. An 
amoralist is less likely to want to make use of such a 
weapon, since his motive for so doing cannot be indignation.
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Finally, the judgement 'You ought to 0' may be used_ 
as a means to satisfy the speaker's own desire that the 
prospective agent 0's. Both hypothetical and categorical 
imperatives may be used to this end, and will be available 
to both moralist and amoralist. As in the antagonistic 
case, the speaker need not believe the categorical imperative 
judgment but he may nevertheless issue it in the hope that 
the recipient's belief in intrinsic reasons will contribute 
to the likelihood of his 0-ing.
3.4. Third Person Moral Judgements
Ought judgements are also made in the third person 
where there is no chance that the judgement can have any 
effect on the action under discussion. Take as examples:
The 1980 Olympics should not be held in Moscow. The 
Shah should return to Iran. Or the more mundane: Mrs
Lewis should not travel on the train today without paying. 
Similar examples occur in the past tense: The Americans 
should not have bombed Hiroshima. The Nazis should not 
have set up concentration camps. Or the personal and 
fictional: Hamlet should not have killed Polonius,
Some of these examples can be construed as cases of 
which generalised forms can influence the speaker in 
deliberation over his own actions, or influence the actions 
of those to whom he asserts the judgement. The judgement 
that Mrs Lewis should not travel on the train without paying 
is obviously a case of this. A person making such a third 
person judgement, would be expected also to make the general 
judgement that people should not travel on the train without 
paying. Hence it might be thought that the purpose of making 
such a third person judgement is to influence action. It 
seems highly implausible that all third person judgements 
should be made for this purpose. Admittedly, part of the 
purpose of making judgements in the third person,-it might 
be claimed, is to prepare oneself and others for whatever 
slight action they can muster in the hope of influencing
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the course of some similar future action. E.g. perhaps 
organise some sort of protest action if it looks as though 
the U.S. is about to use its nuclear weapons again. But 
people continue to make third person judgements with 
categorical imperatives even though they feel that the 
making of such judgements can have no influence over events. 
It is, for the moralist, an essential part of the interest 
he talces in part of the external world that extends beyond 
his control.
How, the moralist will wonder, can the amoralist be 
so narrow-minded as to take an interest only in the events 
which he can influence? And how can the amoralist even 
influence the choices of others indirectly unless he uses 
third person categorical imperative judgements? To the 
second of these questions it may be replied that the amoralist 
may use a categorical imperative in the second person case 
if he wishes to influence the choices of another person if 
he thinks his audience's belief in intrinsic reasons will 
make his utterance effective in guiding action. Although 
the amoralist's chief means of influencing the actions of 
others will be by suggesting consequences of a prospective 
action in the hope that the prospect of those consequences' 
obtaining will itself encourage or deter the agent from per­
forming the action.
To the first of these questions it may be replied that
the amoralist certainly has at his disposal the conceptual
1:
means to assess various possible events over which he has 
no control. He may hope that Reagain becomes president, or 
want Reagan to become president, just as he may hope that 
Ali loses his last fight, or want Ali to lose his last 
fight. He may also make judgements of objective value 
concerning such events, from which his subjective 
pnference may depart. It will be discussed in the next 
Chapter whether there is an entailment from 'it would be 
good if X 0's' to 'There is intrinsic reason for X's 0-ing'.
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Comparing the moralist and amoralist from the 
emotional point of view, the third person categorical 
imperative judgements of the moralist will often be 
accompanied by indignation. And this will not be present 
when the amoralist makes his hypothetical imperative 
judgements, or feigns categorical imperative judgement. But 
it must be repeated that the term * indignant'is used to 
refer to an emotion supported by a particular cognitive 
element, so that in discussing the effect this cognitive 
element has on emotion nothing has been gained by saying 
that the difference concerns the presence or absence of 
indignation.
So far the use of categorical imperatives and hypo­
thetical imperatives has been considered primarily from 
the point of view of the speaker, or person malting the 
judgement. , In cases in which the judgement is asserted 
to an audience, the way in which that judgement is inter­
preted will correspond in the main to the way a moralist 
would classify it if he were himself to make that same 
judgement. Thus moralists will interpret practical judge­
ments as categorical imperatives whenever plausible just 
as they would tend to use categorical imperatives in 
preference to hypothetical imperatives whenever plausible.
(An exception to this has been noted in the case of 
supererogation). An amoralist too is likely to interpret 
a judgement as a categorical imperative whenever plausible, 
having grown up in a society in which this use is widespread.
The only exception to this would arise when the audience 
knows that the spealcer is an amoralist.
A final point of comparison between the hypothetical 
and the categorical imperative in situations in which either 
could be asserted concerns the way in which they are 
supported. The amoralist will aim to spell out the conditional 
indicating the interests of the agent to which the action
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would be ancillary, and the causal route between action 
and furthering of the agent's interest. The moralist 
will aim to enunciate the fact that is to constitute the 
intrinsic reason for action, and indicate why the fact 
do es constitute intrinsic reason for action. The task 
of elaboration is more clear cut for the amoralist but 
this will not deter the moralist from making his judge­
ments when he sees them as correct and of value.
To many moralists, the belief in intrinsic reasons is 
an essential part of what galvanises them into action, and 
what male es life meaningful, and without it they would be 
at a loss. Something external and objective is felt 
necessary as a justification of action. As well as a need 
for intrinsic reasons for actions, there is also a need for 
intrinsic reasons against actions, especially those that 
have already been performed. Moralists often have greatest 
need for intrinsic reasons as a means to justify their 
feelings of hostility towards the self and to justify their 
need for an enemy.
3.5. Prudential Judgements
I shall now briefly consider the effect upon prudential 
judgement of the use of categorical imperatives. As has 
been remarked, there are difficulties in distinguishing 
categorical from hypothetical prudential judgements, 
especially in the first person. What was said concerning 
incontinence in the moral case will apply also to weakness 
of will in the prudential case. The existence of prudential 
cases of incontinence that conform to the pretheoretical 
description can in fact be taken as an argument for the 
categorical imperative status of certain prudential judgement:
Prudential categorical imperatives are perhaps more 
readily distinguishable from hypothetical imperatives in 
the second person, and I shall consider now some uses of 
prudential categorical imperatives.
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One common use of past tense judgements is to advise 
for the future. E.g. You should have asked someone else 
to do the proof reading for you. Clearly this can have 
some effect on future behaviour. But not all examples are 
of this kind. The judgement 'You ought to have changed 
subjects at Cambridge' may be offered as the statement of 
a belief which can no longer have any bearing on the 
person's future judgements. There is also the case of a 
statement made purely to raise hackles because it is known 
that the person to whom it is addressed will strongly 
disagree, whether it be over something that is potentially 
serviceable as advice or not — Such judgements assume a 
categorical imperative basis if they have any pretensions 
to being factual, i.e. are not merely taunts. The hypo­
thetical imperative form can only accommodate them if it 
allows for a vague present desire for a general flourishing.
Present tense prudential judgements can only be 
advice-offering or hackle-raising, though sometimes it is 
difficult to tell which. The judgement 'You shouldn't 
eat white sugar' may be intended as advice directed at the 
person's concern to eat the right kinds of foods, in which 
case it would be construed as a hypothetical imperative.
Or it may be offered despite knowing, that the person is a fir: 
believer that the body will cope with virtually anything it 
is given as fuel. Such a remark assuming the form of a 
categorical imperative is essentially antagonistic and 
can perhaps be seen as the speaker's affirmation of his own
set of values - in order to feel confident about a first
;|
person practical judgement he needs to believe that the 
judgement is universalisable. Alternatively, the remark 
may be made from a sincere interest to prevent any harmful 
effects from afflicting the recipient. The judgement is 
then either categorical, or hypothetical based on a desire 
for future health.
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There will be few instances in which users and non­
users of categorical imperatives can be distinguished with 
any certainty with prudential judgements. Some judgements, 
it has been seen, can only be construed as hypothetical 
imperatives if some very general present desire for future 
welfare is assumed. The believer in intrinsic prudential 
reasons is likelier to be given to making pronouncements 
to others than the non-believer.
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CHAPTER VI. JUSTIFICATION OF THE USE OF CATEGORICAL 
IMPERATIVES
6.1. Types of Justification.
In this chapter I shall offer a rather cursory 
examination of the justification of categorical 
imperatives. I shall not consider prudential judgements, 
and I shall not consider any justifications of moral 
categorical imperatives that aim at justifying general 
rules from which singular judgements may be derived.
This rules out all forms of contractarian argument, 
along with the arguments of Kant.
The types of justification I shall consider may be
as
conveniently characterised/theological, pragmatic and 
metaphysical.
6.2. Theological Justification.
Obviously it would be inappropriate to discuss the 
plausibility of Christianity here. I want only to suggest 
that those acting in accordance with what they take to 
be a divine command, or God's will, need not be seen as 
acting from fear of Hell or hope of Heaven, If this were 
their sole reason for obeying a divine command, then 
their judgements that various actions ought to be undertaken 
would be hypothetical imperatives, as Kant claimed. But as 
most Christians would agree that divine command would give 
them reason to act even if there were to be no personal 
rewards, this would render their judgements categorical 
imperatives according to my definition. There may even be 
some Christians and other religious people who believe in 
a deity that issues commands or prohibitions without any 
rewards or punishments beyond the joys of acting in 
accordance with the will of the deity and the guilt 
incurred in disobeying.
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The notion of a command which cannot be enforced may 
appear a little suspect. If the commands and prohibitions 
of the deity are replaced by preferences for certain actions, 
the role of the deity becomes more intelligible. Acting 
in accordance with God’s will may be thought of as acting 
as God would wish, or as acting in a manner pleasing to 
God, rather than obeying God’s command. Now it might be 
thought that the reason for acting in accordance with God’s 
will is a desire to please God, or a love of God, which 
would again be a non-intrinsic reason. Again, I think,that 
most Christians would consider that God’s will would provide 
them with reason to act even if they had no love for Gk>d or 
desire to please God. If it now be objected that no sense 
can be attached to the idea of a reason for acting in 
accordance with God's will, if it is not based on love or 
punishment and reward, the Christian reply may be rather 
similar to the atheist's portrayal of intrinsic reasons: 
the intrinsic reason God's will, just as X's need just 
is Ein intrinsic reason for Y's action,
A familiar objection to the view that intrinsic reasons 
may stem from the will of the deity arises in Plato's 
Euthyphro, Does God will an action because it is good, or 
is an action good because God wills-' it? If the latter, 
then 'good' means 'willed by God' and we discover whether 
an action is good by discovering whether God wills it, 
for example, by divine revelation or the reference to holy 
scriptures. On this view it could turn out that good 
actions are unpleasant to the self and others. Why then 
should there be reason for a person to follow the will of 
the deity? Perhaps as a result of the deity's 
responsibility for bringing him into existence. There are 
few, however, who would regard this as a satisfactory 
solution to the Euthyphro dilemma, for it is generally 
thought that it cannot just be a piece of luck that good
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actions serve human needs. For goodness to derive from 
God's will, most would require that God necessarily has 
a concern for human interests. But now it is no longer 
clear whether 'good' or 'willed by God' is more basic.
If the former direction of dependence is chosen as 
answer to the Euthyphro dilemma, it might be argued that 
the will of the deity cannot be taken as the reason for 
action, since it is the prior property of goodness in an 
action that determines whether it is willed by the deity.
To this it might be responded that if value or goodness is 
granted to be fixed independently of God's will, then unless 
goodness turns out to be what every individual always 
desires, there need not always be reason for someone to 
bring about value, or perform actions that are good. By 
willing that good actions are performed, the deity could 
then fill the gap between an action's being good and there 
being reason to perform the action, i.e. between 'It would 
be good if X 0 ’d and 'There is reason for X to 0'. If 
good actions will provide reasons that are unquestionably 
based on divine will, if it provides reasons at all,but 
again there may be qualms about accepting the will of a 
merely contingently benevolent deity as reason-providing.
It should appear, therefore, that there are solutions 
to the Euthyphro dilemma on which divine will yields 
intrinsic reasons, if 'goodness' and 'God's will' are only 
contingently related. Most Christians would regard divine 
will as also providing the foundation of intrinsic reasons 
if 'goodness' emd 'God's will' are necessarily related.
6.3. Pragmatic Justifications
By pragmatic justifications of categorical imperatives 
I mean justifications that seek to establish that, whether 
or not a metaphysical justification is available, society
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could not flourish without such an institution. Such 
justifications include the "Noble Lies" of those who 
do not believe in the existence of intrinsic reasons but 
argue that it is necessary that the prevalence of such a 
belief be sustained for the coherence of society.
One pragmatic argument for the justification of 
categorical imperatives is the claim that it is a 
necessary part of moral education. This could be the 
claim that no other linguistic means is available of 
controlling or guiding the actions of children, or that 
insufficient interest in the welfare of others could 
develop across a whole society without the institution of 
categorical imperatives. It was argued in Chapter IV 
that empirical evidence could establish the existence of 
a society in which no categorical imperatives were used, 
or a society in which categorical imperatives were used 
only as a passing phase in moral development. On the 
negative side, empirical evidence could only render implausible 
not disprove the existence of, such a society. I could not 
offer positive empirical evidence, as there was little 
experimental work of the right kind available. But I 
argued that the basic commands that a child has to obey 
are not categorical imperatives, and I see no reason why 
other judgements made by the child and to the child need be 
categorical imperatives.
The view that insufficient benevolent inclinations 
would develop without categorical imperatives to provide 
a sane, happy society that people would choose to live in 
could, this time, be refuted,but not established,by empirical 
evidence, but again there is no evidence of the right sort 
available. The factors that lead to the thriving of a society 
from the viewpoint of all, or the vast majority of, its 
members, are complex and depend on political, economic, 
technological, religious, and artistic factors. My claim
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is that the use of categorical imperatives is not part 
of any political, religious or social institution that 
is necessary for that thriving. In suggesting some 
differences between moral thought incorporating categorical 
imperatives and that based on hypothetical imperatives in 
Chapter V, I hope to have shown that a non-user of 
categorical imperatives, or more strictly a non-believer 
in intrinsic reasons, need not be parasitic upon a 
society in which belief in intrinsic reasons is the norm, 
and hence that a society of such non-believers is not a 
practical impossibility.
Another pragmatic argument for the justification of 
categorical imperatives derives from a consideration of 
the view that morality has a particular purpose. Mackie 
expresses this view as follows:
Protagoras, Hoblfl^ s^, Hume and Warnock (X
are all at least'broadly in agreement
about the problem morality is needed to
solve: limited resources and limited
sympathies together generate both
competition leading to conflict and an
absence of what would be mutually
beneficial cooperation.
Op. Git. p.Ill
Surprisingly, as he has argued against the existence of 
intrinsic reasons, Mackie claims that moral sentiments and 
dispositions, the respect for various obligations, plus 
more formal moral rules and politico-legal devices for law 
enforcement and the making of positive law all contribute 
to the purpose of morality, and may continue to contribute 
in a society whose members accept the inexistence of 
intrinsic reason and invent their own moral code.
But can Mackie consistently claim that such a moral 
code can operate without a belief in intrinsic reasons? When 
a person abandons a belief in intrinsic reasons, moral 
sentiments and dispositions are likely to drop-away though
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there will be some residual feelings for a time, and 
maybe a certain stable core will remain. These feelings 
are likely to acquire a different character as a result 
of the change in cognitive component, and to lose some of 
their severity. It is possible that a person may acquire 
a new set of feelings on launching his chosen moral code, 
and this might be a fitting description in some cases of 
the committed existentialist.
In inventing a new moral code, Mackie thinks that 
some of the old rules will be retained and some new ones 
added. Just as there are moral agents who believe in 
intrinsic reasons but who do not base their moral decisions 
on rules, it is also to be expected that there will be non­
believers in intrinsic reasons who see no place for moral 
rules in their invented morality. On abandoning a belief 
in intrinsic reasons, a moral agent is likely to retain 
his preference for or against deliberation in terms 
of a set of rules. But without intrinsic reasons, what 
reason will there be for acting in accordance with the 
newly chosen or newly endorsed set of rules? Mackie suggests 
that it is the moral feelings that we all have that we can 
fall back on, (op. cit. p.l9l) but such feelings will 
motivate action without the mediation of moral rules, and 
it is unclear how feelings can be attached to the observing 
of unanchored rules. Most people's adherence to a set of 
moral rules seems to rest on an expectation that other 
people will adhere to a similar moral code. Ifhen the whole 
of society has abandoned belief in intrinsic reasons, 
expectations that strangers will share one's moral code 
will, initially at any rate, be reduced. Though Mackie 
himself recommends adopting a set of moral rules that 
accord with his three stages of universalisation, he accepts 
that others will not be bound to do so. A set of unanchored
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moral rules over and above the agent's feelings and 
dispositions could serve as a check on limited sympathies, 
but it will not be necessary that people adopt rules in 
order for society to cohere. This is fortunate,for it is 
difficult to see what reason a person would have for 
keeping to his chosen rules, Mackie himself suggests 
(op, cit, p.191) that we may have to abandon the attempt 
to show why a person should observe his own rules and 
suggests that one can more easily reconcile oneself to this 
by reflecting on the doubts about the rationality of 
prudence.
It is thus dispositions and feelings which will 
provide the foundation for moral behaviour when belief in 
intrinsic reasons has been abandoned. The division of 
dispositions, feelings or sentiments into moral and 
natural, for .a believer in intrinsic reasons,will reflect 
whether or not the feeling is supported by this belief. It 
would be a mistake to think of these natural feelings as 
innate, and as including a person's natural sympathies, and 
to then think of the moral feelings as a necessary adjunct 
to counteract the deficiency of natural sympathy. Feelings 
are inevitably moulded by experience, so that it makes little 
sense to talk of natural sympathy as though it were an innate 
feeling. Everything thus depends on how a person's feelings 
and sympathies develop in a society in which moral education 
is conducted without a cognitive structure based on a belief 
in intrinsic reasons.
Though a morality based on hypothetical imperatives need 
not contain an effective set of moral rules, this need not cast 
doubts on the possibility of a legal system, and enforcement 
procedure. The inflexibility of the Hobbesian state can be 
attributed to the lack of basic sympathetic feelings in 
the (hypothetical) members. Ifhether or not a legal system 
and enforcement procedure are stable depends principally on 
the extent to which the laws and punishments are recognised 
as of overall benefit to the community. The stabilising
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factor resulting from a feeling of moral obligation to 
obey the law will be relatively insignificant, though 
it might be argued that a strong sense of moral obligation 
will limit the need for an elaborate policing system. 
However, it is unrealistic to suppose that a state could 
ever dispense with a means of enforcing its laws, A 
desire for enforcement of laws is a basic essential, and 
the size, and hence cost, of this device will depend on the 
scale on which infringements occur. Again this is a matter 
that cannot be argued without empirical evidence, but I 
believe that the existence of a moral feeling of obligation 
to obey the law will make very little difference to the 
extent of its observance.
Hence I conclude that pragmatic justifications of 
categorical imperatives cannot carry much weight devoid of 
relevant evidence. In any case it would seem that meta­
physical backing for moral beliefs would be required in 
order to support a pragmatic justification. The cost of 
sustaining poorly supported belief in a community is 
appreciable. (Consider, for example, the cost of upholding 
a belief in the literal truth of the contents of the bible.)
6.4. Metaphysical Justifications.
I shall now take a brief look at Mackie's arguments 
against intrinsic reasons that would serve to undermine, 
rather than justify^ the use of categorical imperatives.
The argument from queerness is unlikely to have much 
persuasive power, though by examining the ontological 
status of intrinsic reasons and concluding that such reasons 
must be non-linguistically expressible facts, I hope to 
have shown that the target for the argument from queerness 
has at least become more conspicuous. The argument from 
relativity has been described by Mackie as follows:
The argument from relativity has as its 
premiss the well-known variation in moral 
codes from one society to another and from 
one period to another, and also the 
differences in moral beliefs between groups 
and classes within a complex community.
Op. Cit. P .36
112,
The success of such an argument will obviously depend 
on the items of the moral code that are picked out for 
comparison between and inside societies. Yet it is 
precisely this line of reasoning that is adopted by 
many to argue for the reverse conclusion. The anti- 
objectivists will seize upon some aspect over which 
there is widespread divergence of opinion to argue their 
case. The objectivists will pick some aspect over which 
there is considerable agreement, or towards which opinion 
has converged over a period of time, to argue for the 
existence of some moral feature in the world.
Arguments from relativity (or consensus) usually 
aim at disputing (or establishing) the objectivity of 
some value property or evaluative predicate. The anti- 
objectivist will invariably talce a general predicate like 
'good' whereas the objectivist will consider more 
distinctive predicates like 'courageous* to be central,
(ef Platts op. cit. p.2) However, the issue at hand is 
the existence of intrinsic reasons and the extent to 
which there is consensus over the practical judgements 
which imply the existence of such reasons. The argument 
may proceed either directly to an assessment of the truth 
of a practical judgementj or in two stages, the first of
which would be an assessment of the truth of some evaluative
judgement concerning a potential action, and the second would 
be an assessment of the validity of the implication from 
the evaluative judgement to the practical judgement. I 
shall discuss first the second approach because of the 
light it throws on the relation between evaluative judgements 
and practical judgements. Evaluative predicates of actions, 
such as 'good' and 'courageous' are ob.jective if and only if,
for all possible actions X, the corresponding evaluative
judgements 'X is good' and 'X is courageous' are either true, 
false, or indeterminate, and this truth-value is fixed by the 
way the world is constructed.
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Tile possibility that the truth-value may be 
indeterminate is included to allow for the existence of 
objective vague predicates such as 'slow'.
If these predicates are objective then two people 
cannot diverge in their assessment of the corresponding 
judgements as true, false, or indeterminate,without one 
of these people being in error.
Assuming that both understand the meaning of the 
terms 'good' or 'courageous' the error would be explicable 
in terms of epistemic limitations, either insufficient 
information to hand, or insufficiently developed 
recognitional capacities on the part of the speaker.
Thus if a predicate such as 'good' or 'courageous' is 
objective, a person may be mistaken in judging that a 
certain action has that property. And if a person believes 
that such terras are objective,then he will believe that he 
may be mistaken in making such a judgement and that his 
judgement may diverge in its positive/negative aspect from 
his own preference in the matter. If the predicate is not 
objective,then a person cannot be mistaken in making a 
judgement involving the predicate provided he knows the 
meaning of that predicate. And if a person believes the 
term is not objective,then he will believe that there can 
be no difference between giving his opinion as to whether 
an action satisfies that predicate, and judging that the 
action satisfies' that predicate. He will also believe that 
there can be no divergence between the positive or negative 
aspect of the judgement,and his own favourable or non- 
favourable assessment of the act in question.
How then is the objectivity of a predicate to be 
assessed? One point at which it might be thought the anti- 
objectivist could attack the objectivism is the claim that 
the truth of the judgement 'X is good' is fixed by the way 
the world is constructed. This may also be seen as the claim
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that evaluative predicates denote properties in the 
world. The anti-objectivist might demand that if this 
were the case,then the evaluative predicate ought to be 
reducible to other predicates that clearly do denote 
properties in the world, such as the predicates of some 
natural science. This is a modern way of putting part of 
Moore's argument that goodness cannot be a natural property. 
However, it has been argued that many predicates such as 'is 
red', 'is a strawberry', 'is a car', are not reducible to a 
set of predicates of natural science, yet they are fixed 
by the way the world is constructed in the sense that no 
two entities could differ in respect of their satisfaction 
of such a predicate without differing in respect of their 
satisfaction of some physico-chemical predicate. And once 
it is seen that properties like redness may be fixed by 
the way the world is constructed without 'red* being 
reducible to physico-chemical predicates, then the
I
irreducibility of 'good', 'courageous' etc, cannot be seen 
as counting against their objectivity,
I can see no way in which this argument can be reversed 
in favour of an objectivist view of evaluative predicates 
by arguing that such predicates are fixed by physico-chemical 
predicates in the manner described above. Even if someone 
picked out a precise set of physico-chemical predicates that 
he claimed were sufficiet to fix an evaluative predicate, 
someone else who disagreed as to the extension of the 
predicate could produce a different fixing class of physico­
chemical predicates and it could be claimed by the anti- 
objectivist that both are equally valid. The problem as to 
whether evaluative predicates have a unique extension would 
be no closer to solution.
How then is it to be determined whether divergence 
over the truth-value of such judgements as 'X is good'
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involves error, and hence whether 'good* is objective?
Wiggins has proposed a slightly different account of what 
it is for a predicate to be objective that promises greater 
hope of applicability. According to him, a predicate, P, 
is objective if and only if, there is intersubjective 
agreement over the truth-value of statements of the form 
'X is P ' and the best explanation of such consensus is 
the fact that X is P. This differs from my definition in 
demanding intersubjective agreement as a. necessary condition 
for objectivity. 'Ifhether or not this is too strict cannot 
be established until it is known how great a consensus must 
be to count as intersubjective agreement. On the face of 
it, the problem of determining whether the best explanation 
of the consensus is the fact that X is P , would appear to 
be the same as the problem of determining whether divergence 
of opinion as to whether X is P entails error. The 
difference, I think, is that Wiggins' account places the 
burden of proof with the anti-objectivist in providing an 
alternative explanation of the consensus. He is thus 
taking intersubjective agreement as not just necessary for, 
but also as prima facie evidence for,objectivity. The 
weight of evidence in favour of the objectivity of a 
particular predicate would depend on the extent of the 
consensus and the extent of the convergence over time, however 
these are to be gauged, and the plausibility of alternative 
explanations of the consensus.
A first step towards the establishment of intrinsic 
reasons and justification of categorical imperatives would 
be the establishing of the objectivity of such predicates of 
actions as 'good', 'honest', and 'courageous' from an 
examination of consensus, convergence or some other argument. 
This would establish the existence of facts of the form 'X 
is good' etc. The next step would be to argue that such 
facts constitute partial reasons for action, i.e. that 
'îf X is good then there is reason to perform X' is analytic.
Il6.
Analyticity claims can ultimately only be settled by 
consensus amongst the speech-community, in the light of 
a thorough search for counter-examples. The third step 
would be to argue that such facts constituting partial 
intrinsic reasons to perform x may sometimes combine with 
all relevant non-intrinsic reasons to produce conclusive 
intrinsic reasons to perform x. It is difficult to know 
how this would be argued for.- When people are educated in 
using categorical imperatives or thinking of intrinsic 
reasons for action, they are invariably introduced first to 
putative cases of overall judgments which presuppose the 
possibility of the existence of conclusive intrinsic reasons. 
There would not be much point in categorical imperative 
judgements that could never constitute overall judgements, 
i.e. talce into account all that is known about the agent's 
desires. But this cannot count as an argument against 
the sceptic.
The argument for the existence of intrinsic reasons 
may be disputed at any of these three stages. The objectivity 
of 'good' (it need not matter what sort of perfectionist 
or naturalist theory of the good is adhered to) will be 
less readily accepted than the objectivity of less general 
predicates like 'courageous'. But then the entailment 
from the fact that x is good to the existence of intrinsic 
reason for performing x will be more readily accepted than, 
the corresponding statement with 'courageous'. Someone 
accepting a consensus argument for the objectivity of some 
evaluative predicate but rejecting the step to intrinsic 
reasons may be amenable to a consensus argument directly 
to intrinsic reasons. Such a direct argument might also 
seem preferable in that a wider range of facts may now be 
considered as candidates for intrinsic reasons, rather than 
just those facts that attribute some moral property to the 
prospective action.
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A direct argument might begin with some situation in 
which there is consensus of opinion over a practical 
judgement. For example, in a situation in which a man is 
starving at X ‘s doorstep, there might be consensus over 
the judgement *X ought to give this man food* or the less 
colloquial 'There is reason for X to give this man food*.
But as before, the arguments that aim at placing the 
burden of proof with the opposition carry little persuasive 
power. And the opposition can make several suggestions 
concerning any cases of consensus over evaluative judgements 
and practical judgements that might be taken as evidence 
for objectivity. A principal suggestion might be that con­
sensus centred around false beliefs that were kept in place 
by rigid theological practices. The view that Christianity 
provided the rationale for categorical imperatives has been 
presented forcefully by Anscombe (in *Modern Moral Philosophy* 
Philosophy'58) and is also accepted by Foot. Mackie proposes 
a number of ways in which belief in the objectivity of 
evaluative predicates and intrinsic reasons may be explained 
from an anti-objectivist stance (op. cit. pp.42-46). Some 
of these I would clarify as pragmatic, others bear directly 
on the problem of explaining the appearance of consensus.
6.5. Conclusion.
In attempting to present a minimally vague 
characterisation of what it is to believe in intrinsic 
reasons I hope to have facilitated discussion of the 
e x i s t e n c e  of intrinsic reasons. The metaphysical arguments 
that I have considered here have been inconclusive, but such 
arguments would in any caae be expected to carry little sway 
in changing a person's belief in the existence or inexistence 
of intrinsic reasons. More effective in changing such beliefs 
will be reasoning based on personal experience or empirical
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evidence. People need to come into contact with 
individuals and social groups in which categorical 
imperatives are not used in order for them to become 
convinced that the world need not be a hideous place 
without categorical imperatives. There will be great 
psychological difficulties in practice in changing one’s 
belief in the existence or inexistence of intrinsic reasons. 
Such beliefs are moulded by early education and are difficult 
to reverse. Even if someone has reached a stage at which 
he has no strong preference for or against a morality based 
on categorical imperatives, i.e. has no need to cling to 
one or the other position, it would be difficult for him 
to actually adopt the opposite belief, just as in the case 
of theistic belief, it is difficult for an agnostic to know 
how to make a leap of faith even if he wants to. I recently 
decided to try such a leap of faith with intrinsic reasons.
I planned to take a moral weekend, but I soon realised that 
I could not sincerely claim to have the belief any more 
than an agnostic could take up Pascal’s wager and opt to 
believe in the Christian God. A belief in the existence or 
inexistence of intrinsic reasons can only change 
involuntarily as with any other belief. It cannot be 
changed by decision.
